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From a historical perspective, one of the primary reasons for issuing Islamic religious 
edicts, commonly known as fatwas, was to incite terrorism, and many have been successful in 
achieving their aims. In response, fatwas that challenge terrorism and counter terrorist 
organization actions have also been issued, however, they have been rarely followed. The 
literature and discourse on the subject are sparse and problematic, and have provided 
unconvincing explanations; devoid of a systematic approach to the question, they do not provide 
the context necessary to understand why counter-terror fatwas have been ineffective against 
Islamist terrorism, and none investigated whether the fatwas interacted directly with the Islamist 
core narrative. In this thesis, I argue that counter-terror fatwas have been ineffective because they 
have not discussed or challenged the Qur’anic verses that endorse violence and justify Islamist 
terrorism, and they received no digital news coverage. Using a systematic approach, I employ a 
four-way typology to measure these two variables—content sophistication and online news 
coverage—to provide an answer to the thesis question, and I use supplementary interviews to 
support and explain these findings. As addressed in my thesis, most counter-terror fatwas did not 
challenge or target the Qur’anic verses that specifically condone violence, yet they all received 
digital media coverage. The most plausible interview data suggests that, unlike a conservative 
line of reasoning, a moderate one is required to challenge the Qur’anic verses, but such a line of 
reasoning may not be appreciated by the public. Overall, I use my findings to suggest that, when 
given specific modifications, counter-terror fatwas can become much more effective in deterring 
Islamist terrorism, especially when paired with other counter-narrative initiatives.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Islamic religious edicts, more commonly known as fatwas, have historically been used to 
incite terrorism. For example, one now infamous terror fatwa was issued by Grand Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini on February 14, 1989, in direct response to Salman Rushdie’s book, The 
Satanic Verses. Shortly after the release of the book, Iranian Ayatollah Khomeini broadcast a 
fatwa over Radio Tehran, sentencing Salman Rushdie, and anyone associated with the book, to 
death for apostasy, based on the charge of blasphemy. A revered leader of over 200 million 
Shiite Muslims,1 Khomeini said the following in his four-paragraph terror fatwa: 
In the name of him, the Highest. There is only one God, to whom we shall all return. inform 
all zealous Muslims of the world that the author of the book entitled The Satanic Verses – 
which has been compiled, printed and published in opposition to Islam, the Prophet and 
the Qur’an – and all those involved in its publication who were aware of its contents, are 
sentenced to death.  
 
I call on all zealous Muslims to execute them quickly, where they may be found, so that no 
one else will dare to insult the Muslim sanctities. God willing, whoever is killed on this 
path is a martyr.  
 
In addition, anyone who has access to the author of this book, but does not possess the 
power to execute him, should report him to the people so that they may be punished for his 
actions. 
 
May peace and mercy of God and his blessings be with you.2  
 
Khomeini’s fatwa possesses all the earmarks of terrorism. Jonathan Rauch describes the 
terrorism tactics that Khomeini encouraged and mobilized through the fatwa: “The valorization 
of suicide (“martyrdom”); the designation of civilians as combatants; the choice of a highly 
visible and symbolic target; the use of nongovernmental and civilian agents; perhaps above all, 
																																																						
1 Carly-Sue, “1989: Death Threat Issued Against Rushdie - National Geographic Society,” National Geographic, 
January 31, 2014, https://www.nationalgeographic.org/thisday/feb14/death-threat-issued-against-rushdie/. 





the capacity and determination to strike in cities and towns in the very heart of the West. The 
message to Westerners, not only to Rushdie, was: You are safe nowhere.”3 After this 
proclamation was issued, some of those associated with the work were either seriously wounded 
or even killed.4 In some instances, others that were unaffiliated with the book were killed in the 
crossfire.5 Several serious attempts were made on Rushdie’s life, causing him to spend the next 
nine years in hiding, residing in as many as 30 secret locations throughout the UK under 
specialist protection. 6 Arguably, it was booksellers in the West who suffered the most from the 
violence caused by the terror fatwa.7 Some publishing offices and book stores were bombed, 
while others were set on fire or had their windows smashed. 
Initially, the reception Rushdie’s novel received had been relatively quiet, but 
Khomeini’s terror fatwa served to intensify and escalate the situation dramatically.8 According to 
Kenan Malik’s personal observation from the United Kingdom, the fatwa clearly demarcated the 
point of transition from mere book burnings to aggressive violence directed at others, such as 
bombings.9 The fatwa’s impact can be best succinctly captured by the words of Peter Mayer, the 
CEO of Penguin Books and a man located at the heart of the Rushdie fiasco. He states that prior 
																																																						
3 Jonathan Rauch, “In Hindsight, the War on Terror Began With Salman Rushdie,” The Atlantic, March 2015, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/03/in-hindsight-the-war-on-terror-began-with-salman-
rushdie/303854/. 
4 Christopher Hitchens, “Assassins of the Mind,” Vanity Fair, February 2009, 
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2009/02/hitchens200902. 
5 Hugh Pope, “Muslim Mob Torches Hotel, Killing 35 : Turkey: The Target Is the Translator of Rushdie’s ‘Satanic 
Verses.’ He Escapes by Firefighters’ Ladder,” Los Angeles Times, July 3, 1993, http://articles.latimes.com/1993-07-
03/news/mn-9699_1_satanic-verses. 
6“1989: Ayatollah Sentences Author to Death,” BBC News, 1989, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/february/14/newsid_2541000/2541149.stm. 
7 Daniel Pipes, The Rushdie Affair: The Novel, the Ayatollah, and the West (New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers, 2003), 170–71. 
8 Malik, From Fatwa to Jihad: The Rushdie Affair and Its Aftermath.; Tariq Modood, “British Asian Muslims and 
the Rushdie Affair,” “Race”, Culture and Difference, 1992, 260–77. 




to the issuing of the fatwa, there were not many protests in Britain, and certainly few that were 
memorable: “I cannot recall the protests here in the UK before the fatwa. If I had I would have 
responded as I did to all the other letters I received.”10 However, after the fatwa Mayer recalls 
being bombarded with intimidating threats: “I had letters written in blood pushed under the door 
of my house. I had telephone calls in the middle of the night, saying not just that they would kill 
me but that they would take my daughter and smash her head against a concrete wall. Vile 
stuff.”11   
Keeping the sheer scale of the threats and violent backlash in mind, Khomeini’s fatwa is 
certainly not the only example of a fatwa encouraging terrorism. Another notable example 
involves Osama Bin Laden, the leader of Al Qaeda. In 1998, Bin Laden issued a fatwa that 
sanctioned jihad against Jews and Crusaders everywhere. The fatwa denounced American 
involvement in the Middle East as an act of war against God, his Prophet, and Muslims, and it 
forewarned of US interest in destabilizing Iraq and fragmenting other Islamic countries. The 
fatwa also presented a case that Islamic scholars throughout history have all uniformly agreed 
on—the principle that whenever a Muslim country is attacked, jihad becomes an individual duty. 
Citing seven passages from the Qur’an, the fatwa justified the obligation of engaging in jihad 
against all Americans, regardless of whether they were civilians or military personnel, and 
refusing to stop until they had successfully driven the United States out of Muslim territory.12  
Even taking Khomeini’s fatwa into account, Osama Bin Laden’s 1998 terror fatwa is 
arguably the most significant fatwa to have influenced and ultimately transformed Islamic 
																																																						
10 Ibid., 12. 
11 Ibid. 





terrorism. Lisa Magloff notes that Islamic extremist terrorist groups from all over the world have 
used this fatwa “to justify attacks on military and civilian targets.”13  Michael Scheuer describes 
how the fatwa continues to impact the US:  
While speculative, this fatwa may be more important today than at any time since its 
issuance. With its clear call and religious authorization for indiscriminate attacks on 
Americans, the fatwa provides potential motivation and justification for what appears to be 
an increasing number of young U.S.-citizen Muslim males who are contemplating or 
planning violence in the United States.14  
 
Since 9/11 there have been countless Islamic terrorist attacks in the US alone.15 From the dates’ 
close proximity between the fatwa and 9/11, it is not hard to believe that Bin Laden’s fatwa may 
very well have influenced the changing paradigm of Islamic terrorism that was largely confined 
to the Middle East, effectively broadening the target of terrorist attacks to include the West, and 
in particular, the US.  
 Widening the political lens further and encompassing earlier dates, other notable fatwas 
have been issued that successfully encouraged terrorism. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s 
assassination in 1981 was attributed to a fatwa calling for his death, issued by Sheikh Omar 
Abdel Rahman, the spiritual leader of an extremist group called Jama’at al-Jihad.16 New York 
City’s World Trade Center bombing in 1993 was also attributed to Rahman’s fatwa, which was 
received by the Muslims terrorists before even planning their attack.17 Other, smaller-scale 
fatwas should not be left out as well. In April 2016, Egypt Grand Mufti Dr. Shawki Allam 
																																																						
13 Lisa Magloff, “Fatwa,” The SAGE Encyclopedia of Terrorism (SAGE Publications, 2011), 
doi:10.4135/9781483381411.n219. 
14 Michael Scheuer, Osama Bin Laden (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 229. 
15 “Big List of Muslim Terror Attacks in U.S. since 9/11,” WND, July 16, 2015, http://www.wnd.com/2015/07/big-
list-of-muslim-terror-attacks-in-u-s-since-911/. 
16 Gabriel Weimann, “Cyber-Fatwas and Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34, no. 10 (2011): 766, 
doi:10.1080/1057610X.2011.604831. 




reported to have found 3000 fatwas calling for the destruction of churches in Egypt (with even 
more fatwas calling for the demolition of heritage sites in Cairo and Giza). 18 Interestingly, 
church bombings continue to be a reoccurring theme in Egypt, with the most recent incident 
affecting two churches in April 2017 and killing more than 40 people.19  
Fatwas are rulings by Islamic clerics, and they are designed to guide Muslims to paradise 
by delineating which actions are necessary to reach that state. Throughout Islam’s history, 
millions of fatwas have been issued, mostly to address issues encountered by followers, such as 
marriage customs, financial proceedings, and moral inquiries.20 However, many fatwas that call 
for war and jihad have also been issued. Because they exert considerable influence on pious 
Muslims who are preoccupied chiefly with attaining paradise, and cause them to take direct 
action against others, fatwas can be an effective tool when used to incite terrorism.  
Although many of the fatwas call for terrorism, fatwas that challenge terrorism and seek 
to counter the actions of terrorist organizations also exist. Some believe that counter-terror 
fatwas carry a lot of power and work to deter terrorism. A strong promoter of this belief, Ed 
Husain, Quilliam’s Co-Founder and Co-Director, describes three benefits that he believes 
prominent counter-terror fatwa citing scripture can do:  
First, it emboldens other Muslim thought leaders to amplify their voices against extremism. 
Secondly, it prevents activist Muslims from considering suicide bombers as “martyrs”, and 
thus removes the hero status currently attached to murderers. And finally, a fatwa 
challenging perceived “martyrdom operations” will inject doubt into the minds of potential 
suicide bombers. Where there is doubt, in Islamic religious behavior, there is avoidance. 
																																																						
18 Ashraf Abd al-Hameed, “In Egypt, ‘3000 Extremist Fatwas’ Incite Destruction of Churches,” Al Arabiya English, 
April 1, 2017, https://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2017/04/01/In-Egypt-3000-extremist-fatwas-incite-
destruction-of-churches.html. 
19 “Twin Church Bombings in Egypt Kill More than 40,” CBC News, April 9, 2017, 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/egypt-church-bombing-1.4062795. 




Suicide bombers currently kill because they have certainty (yaqeen) of being rewarded in 
the next life (akhirah).21  
 
However, while many instances of terror fatwas being followed exist, examples of counter-terror 
fatwas being followed are relatively rare. Even the most recent counter-terror fatwa, the 
Bangladeshi fatwa against the Islamist killings of religious minorities and secularists, issued on 
June 18, 2016, with the signatures of more than 100,000 Islamic clerics, was unable to deter a 
jihadist terrorist attack at a café in the following month, regarded as the “country’s worst ever 
militant attack.”22  
 These glaring facts raise the question: Why are terror-inducing fatwas effective in 
inciting terrorism, while counter-terror fatwas have had little overall effect in preventing 
terrorism and deterring terrorist organizations? Before we can answer this question, we need to 
explore what makes a fatwa effective. According to John L. Esposito, professor of Religion and 
International Affairs and of Islamic Studies at Georgetown University, the fatwas’ authority is 
based on the issuer’s education level, his status in the community, and the persuasiveness of his 
fatwa.23 I understand the issuer’s education level to mean that he had pursued his studies in one 
of the eight legal schools of Islamic thought: Hanafi (Sunni), Maliki (Sunni), Shafi’I (Sunni), 
Hanbali (Sunni), Ja’fari (Shia), Zaydi (Shia), Thahiri and Ibadi.24 I recognize the issuer’s status 
in the community to mean that he is received positively by at least some Muslims and that he 
																																																						
21 Ed Husain, “Fatwas Can Be a Force for Good,” The Gaurdian, February 26, 2010, 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2010/feb/26/fatwa-salman-rushdie-terrorism. 
22 “Bangladesh Clerics Issue Fatwa on Islamist Killings,” Al Arabiya English, June 14, 2016, 
https://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/gulf/2016/06/14/Bangladesh-clerics-issue-fatwa-on-Islamist-killings.html; 
“Bangladesh Attack: Searching for the ‘Affluent Jihadists,’” BBC News, July 5, 2016, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36710177. 
23 John L Esposito, What Everyone Needs to Know about Islam, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2011), 166–67. 




holds sway over them. I acknowledge the fatwa’s persuasiveness to mean that it is written in a 
way that some Muslims find convincing.  
I am focusing on only persuasiveness because the measurement of the other two variables 
is particularly challenging given the time and resources available for this research. Information 
regarding the issuer’s education level is not readily available, and it is hard to verify. Moreover, 
the issuer’s status in the community is hard to measure.  
In this thesis, I define persuasiveness as the sophistication of content which is measured 
in reference to at least one Qur’anic verse that endorses violence and is typically invoked by 
Islamist terrorists use to justify their action. However, I must acknowledge that sophistication 
defined in such an objective manner may not do justice to the other attributes of sophistication of 
the fatwa, such as length, quality of argument, quality of contextualization. Nevertheless, it is 
useful as a clear and objective way to analyze whether a fatwa with reference to Qur’anic verses 
endorsing violence compared to one with no references, might at least, be more persuasive. 
Therefore, this thesis argues that counter-terror fatwas have not been particularly effective 
because their content is rarely sophisticated; they hardly discuss, let alone challenge, the specific 
Qur’anic verses that endorse the acts of violence that are used to justify terrorism. At most they 
cite verses that present Islam as a religion of peace to justify their positions. Moreover, this thesis 
additionally argues that even those with higher levels of sophistication have been rendered 
largely ineffective because counter-fatwas receive relatively little news coverage, particularly 
when compared to terror-inducing fatwas.  
 In order to address these two hypotheses, first I will uncover the issue that may be 
preventing counter-terror fatwas from becoming more effective against Islamist terrorism and 




counter-terror fatwas as a counter-terrorism tool, specifically as an addition to counter-narratives. 
This thesis will begin with a chapter on both the literature review and methodology. For the 
literature review section, I briefly review the current research themes and trends that are relevant 
to this paper’s topic, such as terrorism, counter-terrorism, countering violent extremism, fatwas 
and terrorism and counter-terror fatwas. This section allows me to place myself in the broader 
literature and contextualize my contribution. For the methodology section, I explain my study 
design, review how I compiled my list of counter-terror fatwas, analyzed these counter-terror 
fatwas (which includes the use of a four-way typology), and conducted interviews with counter-
terror fatwa issuers and scholars on Islam. With my thorough explanation of my methodology 
tactics, I demonstrate how the study investigated and explored the thesis question. The following 
chapter examines the study findings on counter-terror fatwas. Drawing from my list of counter-
terror fatwas, comprised by ones that I found to be available, I analyze the counter-terror fatwas’ 
content and news coverage. In regards to analyzing the counter-terror fatwas’ content, I search 
the content to see if any specific Qur’anic verses that are typically used to invoke and justify 
terrorism by Islamists are mentioned. As for media coverage analysis, I investigate the number of 
counter-terror fatwas covered by at least one digital newspaper article. In turn, I use a four-way 
typology that uses these two variables, content sophistication and news coverage, to understand 
why counter-terror fatwas have not been effective against Islamist terrorism. Altogether, the 
systematic approach of this study and its findings help provide a possible answer to the thesis 
question. The interviews with counter-terror fatwa issuers also support and explain these 
findings. The final chapter explains why counter-terror fatwas still can be an effective tool 




Islam, expand on the influence of religious ideas, and discuss how counter-terror fatwas could 
possibly be made more effective in deterring Islamist terrorism.  
Speaking in broad terms, this study finds that the vast majority of counter-terror fatwas 
did not challenge the specific Qur’anic verses that endorse violence and are used to justify 
terrorist acts committed by Islamists. Instead, they cited Qur’anic verses that present Islam as a 
religion of peace. These verses have conditions and limitations that, in turn, prevent them from 
making neither unequivocal nor absolute pronouncements of peace. Moreover, this study finds 
that the vast majority of counter-terror fatwas that cited verses presenting Islam as a religion of 
peace had news coverage, but this starkly contrasts with the few counter-terror fatwas that 
challenged the specific Qur’anic verses endorsing violence, which received no news coverage. 
The interview data offers several explanations that account for the study’s findings. The most 
plausible explanation suggests a constraint that is inherent to the religion which prevents 
counter-terror fatwas from directly challenging the specific Qur’anic verses that endorse 
violence. According to the issuer of a counter-terror fatwa that directly challenges the specific 
Qur’anic verses, few counter-terror fatwas directly challenge specific Qur’anic verses because 
the issuers operate on the same lines of reasoning as those who issue terror fatwas; unlike a 
conventional line of reasoning, only a moderate one can directly challenge the Qur’anic verses. 
However, a moderate line of reasoning may not be appreciated by the public. The issuer’s 
counter-terror fatwa was briefly covered in the Pakistani news, and disseminated by his 





This study of counter-terror fatwas is important to counter-terrorism because the Islamist 
narrative is “central to radicalization, extremism and terrorism”,25 and the counter-narrative 
strategy, a category which counter-terror fatwas would fall under, can counter these narratives 
and “effectively reduce support for terrorism.”26 As it currently stands, tackling the Islamist 
narrative is a “counter-extremism priority.”27 I believe this research may be of interest to 
counter-terrorism experts and government policy analysts because it can potentially salvage and 
make better what could be a very potent addition to the counter-narrative campaign against 












25 Jonathan Russell and Haras Rafiq, “Countering Islamist Extremist Narratives: A Strategic Briefing,” Quilliam, 
2016, 4, http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/countering-islamist-extremist-
narratives.pdf. 
26 K. Braddock and J. Horgan, “Towards a Guide for Constructing and Disseminating Counter-Narratives to Reduce 
Support for Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 731, no. December (2015): 381, 
doi:10.1080/1057610X.2015.1116277. 




Chapter 2: Literature Review & Methodology 
In this chapter, I begin by conducting a literature review, then proceed to the study’s 
methodology.   
Literature Review 
To understand how fatwas can be appropriated and used for the purposes of countering 
terrorism, we must first understand on a fundamental level what terrorism is, how it has become 
entwined with religion, and what role fatwas have had in inciting it. It is also critical to 
understand how terrorism is countered, and which developments—if any—are used to combat 
religious terrorism. After outlining the current academic literature on counter-terror fatwas, 
which as this paper shows, is relatively sparse and problematic, and does not help us understand 
why counter-terror fatwas have not been effective against Islamist terrorism, I situate my 
findings within the literature and bridge some of the existing gaps. In this section, I conduct a 
brief review of the following relevant research themes and trends, as well as key definitions, that 
are pertinent to this paper’s topic: terrorism, counter-terrorism, countering violent extremism, 
fatwas and terrorism, and counter-terror fatwas.  
Terrorism 
According to one definition, terrorism is the premeditated use of violence or threat to use 
violence, by individuals or subnational groups, to obtain a political or social objective through 
the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate noncombatant victims.28 
Terrorism is usually either domestic or international in scope: domestic terrorism features attacks 
within the terrorists’ and victims’ country of origin; international terrorism features attacks 
																																																						
28 Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, The Political Economy of Terrorism (2005; reprint, Cambridge: Cambridge 




where the terrorists or victims come from another country.29 Modern international terrorism 
started in 1968 when a Palestinian terrorist group, belonging to the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization, carried out the first airplane hijacking.30 The hijacking became the first of many. 
From then until the late 1980s, international terrorism was largely comprised of nationalist and 
radical revolutionaries.31 However, the 1990s brought about a significant shift in terrorism. 
Religious Terrorism  
In the late 1990s, terrorism took on a deeply religious edge. The secular Palestinian 
terrorists were eclipsed by Islamist terrorist groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic 
Jihad.32 After the mid 1990s, religious extremists “came to dominate and increased the 
carnage.”33 Indeed, terrorist organizations emerged that were guided primarily by religious 
motives.34  In fact, Hoffman argues that starting then, the “religious imperative for terrorism 
[became] the most important defining characteristic of terrorism today.”35 Official assessments 
corroborated this trend as well. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service 2000 Public Report 
acknowledged the presence of religious terrorism, calling Islamic extremism “one of the prime 
motivators of contemporary terrorism.”36 Just a decade later, the same agency reported that “the 
																																																						
29 Khusrav Gaibulloev and Todd Sandler, “An Empirical Analysis of Alternative Ways That Terrorist Groups End,” 
Public Choice 160, no. 1–2 (2014): 3; 5, doi:10.1007/s11127-013-0136-0. 
30 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 63. 
31 David C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” in Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand 
Strategy (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 46–73. 
32 Gaibulloev and Sandler, “An Empirical Analysis of Alternative Ways That Terrorist Groups End,” 6. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 82. 
35 Ibid. 





most salient [terrorist] threat has the form of Islamist extremism”.37 In other words, religious 
terrorism had become the most prominent threat in terrorism. 
The upsurge in religious terrorism on the global scale was dramatic. Citing the RAND 
Terrorism Incident Database, Hoffman notes that in 1968, none of the eleven identifiable 
terrorist groups operating in that year were religious.38 It was not until 1980 that religious 
terrorist groups made their first appearances.39 By 1994, 16 out of 49 known terrorist groups 
were identified as being religious, and one year later, this had increased to 26 out of 56 terrorist 
organizations, jumping from a third of terrorist groups to almost a half.40 David Rapoport, the 
author of the four waves of terrorism theory, labelled the last wave as being religiously 
motivated, with Islam being at the “heart of the wave”.41 While Hoffman attributes this shift to 
religious terrorism to the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, Rapoport claims that the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan played an integral role as well.42  
According to Hoffman, religious terrorism can be recognized by its distinct core 
characteristics.43 First, religious terrorism focuses on a transcendental dimension instead of a 
political one; this condones violence that is committed because of a theological demand. Second, 
religious terrorists are typically vested in wiping out broadly-defined groups of enemies and, 
unlike secular terrorists, are not concerned with the counterproductive effects produced by 
indiscriminate killing. Lastly, they tend to view themselves as outsiders, seeking necessary and 
																																																						
37 CSIS, “Canadian Security Intelligence Service 2010-2011 Public Report,” 2010, https://www.csis-
scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/nnlrprt/2010/index-en.php. 
38 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 84. 
39 Ibid., 85. 
40 Ibid., 86. 
41 Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” 61. 
42 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 85; Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” 61. 




dramatic change to the existing order. Because of the necessity of the matter, adding a religious 
context to terrorism allows group members to sanction “almost limitless violence against a 
virtually open-ended category of targets.”44  
Counter-Terrorism  
Fortunately, counter-terrorist strategies that seek to curb terrorism exist. Counter-
terrorism is defined as actions intended to “ameliorate the threat and consequences of terrorism,” 
and the actions are typically carried out by “governments, military alliances, international 
organizations (e.g., INTERPOL), private corporations, or private citizens”.45 Counter-terrorism 
has typically been conducted through defensive and proactive measures aimed to prevent 
terrorist attacks from happening, and to minimize the effects of successful attacks. A common 
defensive measure would be the presence of metal detectors at all airports. Proactive measures 
are offensive in nature, as the targeted government directly confronts the terrorist group or its 
supporters, and they “may destroy terrorists’ resources (e.g., training camps), curb their finances, 
eliminate their safe havens, or kill and capture their members”.46 A notable example of proactive 
measures is the US-led military invasion of Afghanistan in response to 9/11 and the consequent 
invasion of Iraq eighteen months later.  
Proactive militaristic measures have been particularly ineffective against terrorism, 
especially those with religious imperatives. While terrorism in general may never be eradicated, 
most individual terrorist campaigns do have an end point, although very rarely because of a 
military campaign conducted by a governmental force. According to research carried out by the 
																																																						
44 Ibid. 
45 Todd Sandler, “Terrorism and Counterterrorism: An Overview,” Oxford Economic Papers 67, no. 1 (2015): 12–
13, doi:10.1093/oep/gpu039.  




RAND corporation in 2008, an analysis of 648 terrorist groups operating between 1968 and 2006 
demonstrate that terrorist groups “rarely cease to exist as a result of winning or losing a military 
campaign”—only ten percent secured victory, and seven percent were defeated by way of 
military force.47 Instead, the two most common explanations for a group’s demise were 
suppression by local police or intelligence agencies (40%) and reaching a political compromise 
(43%). Interestingly, while around 62% of terrorist groups have dissolved since 1968, only 32% 
of religious groups have ended.48 
Despite numerous studies that depict the detrimental effects of proactive militaristic 
measures, they continue to be deployed. The war on Iraq was a strategic mistake that drew the 
US into a protracted war. By ousting Saddam Hussein, the US inadvertently created a security 
vacuum that helped turn Iraq into a “breeding ground for jihad and religious extremism.”49 
Despite the emergence of new terrorist groups, US reliance on proactive militaristic measures did 
not abate. Charles Townshend notes that even a decade after the War on Terror, several agencies 
believed that “terrorist networks could be taken down by removal of their ‘masterminds’, and 
that smart weapons and pilotless drones could achieve this without counterproductive political 
effects.”50 Even the recent Obama administration relied on drone attacks to eliminate terrorist 
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leaders and members,51 and deployed 10 times more drone strikes than the previous Bush 
administration.52 
Countering Violent Extremism 
Aside from militaristic proactive measures against terrorism, there are also non-
militaristic proactive measures, such as countering violent extremism initiatives. According to 
one definition, countering violent extremism is the “use of non-coercive means to dissuade 
individuals or groups from mobilizing towards violence and to mitigate recruitment, support, 
facilitation or engagement in ideologically motivated terrorism by non-state actors in furtherance 
of political objectives.”53 The UK was the first to take the CVE approach towards counter-
terrorism; their strategy was rolled out as early as 2003, which included the PREVENT program 
that had the purpose of preventing “people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism.”54 
The USA’s CVE approach followed suit and was developed in 2011, a time when addressing 
violent extremism, particularly its recruitment and radicalization, had become the White House’s 
top national security priority.55  
There are presently two approaches in CVE: the public health approach and the narrow 
approach. The public health model approach was first proposed by the Commission on Chronic 
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Illness in 1957 as a model that classified preventive interventions for diseases.56 The public 
health model intended to discover the best sequence of solutions that would effectively respond 
to varying diseases in varying contexts, instead of focusing on a one-size-fits-all solution. The 
public health approach to countering diseases met with success in the medical field.57 For 
example, the public health campaigns against smoking in the US helped significantly reduce the 
number of lung and heart diseases. The public health model approach also enjoyed success in 
minimizing the impact of social problems, such as automobile safety. There have been several 
studies that advocated this approach in CVE, with Weine et al. and Bjørgo’s work contributing to 
the conceptual framework.58 According to Stevan Weine et al., the public health approach:  
creates opportunities for multi-purpose programming, where for example, addressing 
violent extremism can become part of a broader platform for addressing other youth well-
being concerns, such as involving identity, mental health and gender violence. Also, a 
public health approach may be able to avoid the stigma associated with criminal justice 
engagement perceived as identifying a suspect community. Lastly, a public health approach 
may open up other approaches to organizing and funding CVE programs, by leveraging 
existing public health resources.59   
 
The original public health model had three levels—primary, secondary and tertiary—and 
they were adapted specifically to CVE. The tertiary level is engaged after radicalization has 
taken place. Programs at this level in CVE provide alternatives to measures such as 
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incarceration, and focus on separating the extremist individual from their violent extremist 
network and violent behavioral tendencies. Two notable example programs include Sweden’s 
Exit Fryshuset and Australia’s Community Integration Support Program. There also are 
programs that work with correctional facilities, and successful examples can be found in several 
countries.60 
At the secondary-level, CVE programs target individuals who exhibit signs of 
radicalization. The intended recipients for these programs are individuals engaging with either a 
violent extremist network or its ideology, although for the former, they typically address 
individuals on the cusp of the groups or recently added and are not completely indoctrinated. 
Programs at this level intervene to prevent the individual’s further radicalization. A good 
example of secondary-level CVE is Norway’s Action Plan against Radicalization and Violent 
Extremism.61  
Primary-level CVE programs are intended to prevent radicalization. These programs 
inform individuals about violent extremism and prevent factors that promote the radicalization of 
individuals. Notable projects examples include Denmark’s A Common and Safe Future: An 
Action Plan to Prevent Extremist Views and Radicalization Among Young People, the Royal 
Canadian Mountain Police’s National Security Youth Outreach Program, and the Australian 
Multicultural Foundation’s community awareness training package.62 
Advocates of the narrow approach oppose the public health approach, and argue that 
primary-level CVE programs are problematic. Shandon Harris-Hogan et al. argue that while the 
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public health approach is not without merit, it carries risks when dealing with violent extremism. 
In their study of Australia’s CVE efforts, they identified two problems with the primary-level 
programs: there is no independent evaluations or evidence-based research presenting findings 
that indicate if these prevention programs have decreased violent extremism, and using broad 
targeting tactics risks stigmatizing communities. Because of the potential risks and lack of 
conclusive findings, Harris-Hogen et al. argue for a narrow focus in CVE, advocating for a 
targeted intervention on individuals who are in the process of radicalizing.63 
While some researchers are skeptical of the primary-level CVE initiatives’ effectiveness 
in reducing violent extremism, many still champion them and believe they hold an important 
place in the dialogue against terrorism. A particular type of primary-level CVE project that is 
advocated is the development of the counter-narratives. Terrorism counter-narratives are 
“designed to contradict the themes that fuel and sustain terrorist narratives, and by extension, 
discourage the support for [the] terrorism they foster.” 64 They are widely recognized as an 
“important strategic component of countering violent extremism.”65 They seek to challenge the 
narrative that states “Islam is under attack and we must defend it.” 66 As it currently stands, this 
Islamist narrative is central to terrorism, extremism, and radicalization: “In terrorism, it is used to 
promote violence, in extremism it is used to promote values that are antithetical to human rights 
norms, and in radicalization it is used to exploit vulnerable people and recruit them to the cause.” 
67 Because it is rooted so deeply, according to the Quilliam Foundation, a counter-extremism 
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think tank, tackling this narrative is a “counter-extremism priority,” and failure to do so will 
reduce the effectiveness of  other counter-extremism works and operations. 68 Unfortunately, 
counter-narrative work did not progress much over the years.69 According to Alex P. Schmid, a 
scholar in terrorism studies, a “lack of funding” and “lack of development of effective and tested 
soft power instruments that target the hearts and minds of would-be jihadists” limited all 
efforts.70 Despite there being some focus on Islamist narratives and counter-narratives, almost no 
research on terror fatwas and counter-terror fatwas has been conducted.  
Fatwas and Terrorism  
To date, there has been minimal research on the role of fatwas in terrorism. In terms of 
academic endeavours, very few have given the topic more than a cursory look. Bruce Hoffman, 
for example, briefly cites fatwas as an example to substantiate his claim that clerics have the 
ability to sanction terrorism, which he argues is a problem that afflicts both the Sunni and Shia 
sects.71 He mentions Khomeini’s death fatwa against Rushdie, as well as Rahman’s death fatwa 
against President Sadat. Another example is provided by liberal Tunisian columnist Lafif 
Lakhdar, writing for the London-based Arabic-language newspaper Al-Hayat.72 His article has 
been partially translated by MEMRI from Arabic to English. He discusses the role of fatwas in 
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Only two scholars to date have meaningfully engaged with the topic of fatwas in relation 
to terrorism. Schmuel Bar was the first to conduct research on the significance of fatwas in 
terrorism in his book published in 2006, and Gabriel Weimann published an article in 2011.73 
Bar researched the link between fatwas and terrorism, citing the rise of the modern Islamist jihad 
movement since the 1980s as coinciding with an increase of fatwas that identify jihad as an 
obligatory action, as well as provide instructions on how to wage it.74 According to Bar, terror 
fatwas address a wide variety of issues, such as:  
 the definition and identification of the battle space in which jihad is to be undertaken; the 
necessary conditions for jihad; the identity of the “infidels” whom jihad must be waged 
against; who must participate in jihad and how; what are the legitimate means and who are 
the legitimate targets of jihad; the legitimacy of suicide attacks and other issues.75 
 
Both Bar and Weimann indicate that fatwas play an integral role in terrorism. Weimann echoes 
Bar’s argument that the use of fatwas is “a major instrument in bridging current terrorism and 
religion.” 76 Like Bar, Weimann examined the ways in which terror fatwas contribute to 
terrorism, such as “justifying the use of suicide terrorism, the killing of innocents, the killing of 
children and women, the killing of Muslims or the use of various weapons (including weapons of 
mass destruction and cyberterrorism.”77 While both Bar and Weimann argue that fatwas are an 
instrumental tool in Islamist terrorism, Bar actually explains the role of fatwas in Islam and in 
terrorism, with some theological rigour. Weimann relies on Bar’s research as a foundation, and 
employs a more descriptive approach to the topic. 
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Counter-Terror Fatwas  
Unsurprisingly, few scholars have taken the time to examine terror fatwas, and this 
extends to counter-terror fatwas as well. For example, John L. Esposito briefly references 
counterterror fatwas, simply arguing they were “used extensively to challenge claims of the 
Islamic legitimacy of violence used for political ends.”78 As an example, he cites the infamous 
600-page counterterror fatwa published in 2010 by the popular scholar and preacher Muhammad 
Qadri. Esposito refers to the fatwa as an absolute denunciation of terrorism, but as I later show, 
this fatwa is anything but that.  
In addition to there being scant literature on counter-terror fatwas—none of it is helpful 
in understanding why counter-terror fatwas have not been effective against Islamist terrorism. In 
fact, some of the research has its own problems. One prominent article examines pro-US fatwas, 
a topic close to counter-terror fatwas. It is quite dated, though, since it was published in 2003.79 
In this article, Charles Kurzman challenges the former US Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul 
Wolfowitz’s claim that Ayatollah Ali Sistani’s fatwa in 2004 was the first pro-US fatwa in 
history by examining a list of fatwas previously issued. He categorizes pro-US fatwas into three 
groups: those motivated by strategic concerns, sympathy for U.S. victims of terror, or a 
commitment to American values, such as democracy.  
Unfortunately, Kurzman’s interpretation of motives for fatwas, particularly those he 
categorizes into the second and third category, are questionable. Regarding the second category, 
he explicitly considers any public statements against terrorism as evidence of the issuers’ 
sympathy for the victims of terror. He cites as examples public statements from Ayatollah Ali 
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Khamenei, Shaykh Hussein Fadlallah, Shaykh Omar Bakri, and Yusuf Al Quradawi. Needless to 
say, more nuance must be exercised when determining the intent of the fatwa issuers. Indeed, the 
issuers he cites are all strange bedfellows when it comes to the topic of sympathy for victims of 
terror. Like his predecessor Khomeini, who encouraged the “Death to America” chants during 
protests and on other occasions since the revolution 80, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has justified the 
use of this chant as well.81 Shaykh Hussein Fadlallah, the founding member and the spiritual 
leader of Hizbollah, personally approved the 1983 suicide truck bomb attacks that destroyed the 
American Embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut, and killed more than 300 people. He even 
gave his blessing to the suicide bombers before they embarked on their final mission.82 
Moreover, he issued a fatwa prior to his death sanctioning the act of suicide bombing. Shaykh 
Omar Bakri was the leader of the Al Muhajiroun, a radical non-violent Islamist movement in 
Britain. He not only referred to 9/11 terrorists as “the Magnificent 19” and the London 7/7 
terrorists as the “Fantastic Four”83, but also preached in favour of the killings of “kuffar” women 
and children.84 Lastly, Quradawi made a public statement against the 9/11 attack and issued a 
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“pro-US” fatwa allowing US Muslims to partake in the US invasion of Afghanistan, and ruled 
that it is permissible to kill apostates, homosexuals, and Israelis.85 He also is the spiritual guide 
for the Muslim Brotherhood, and was recently placed on the “terror list” by Saudi Arabia, 
Bahrain, Egypt and the UAE.86  
An article on counter-terror fatwas and the role they can play against terrorism has been 
published, but it is not without problems. In “Role of Fatwa in the Fight against Terrorism,” 
Chiroma et al. argues that governments should enforce fatwas like laws. In focusing on fatwas as 
a response to Islamist terrorists, such as Boko Haram, the authors propose that the Nigerian 
government “should immediately set up a powerful Islamic fatwa institutions, or empower the 
existing ones with statutory legal backing similar to the practice in modern Muslim countries like 
Malaysian.”87 The Malaysian authors advocate that other countries dealing with Islamist 
terrorism should emulate their country’s fatwa model, in which fatwas have become 
“institutionalized and [have] been used in all the spheres of administration and activities related 
to human endeavour.”88 In fact, the domain of fatwas has been institutionalized in Malaysia; 
published fatwas become binding and enforceable verdicts on all Malaysians, and in most cases 
have the force of law.89 Several pressing issues interfere with Chiroma et al.’s arguments. 
Implicit to their proposal is the suggestion for governments to become involved in religion, and 
for many countries, this violates the separation of religion and state. While the US is the only 
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country that has a full constitutional separation of religion and state, according to a study 
conducted by Jonathan Fox, “democracies have higher levels of SRAS [Separation of Religion 
and State] than do autocracies.” 90 Another issue is their claim about the remarkable success rate 
of governments that enforce fatwas as laws: “Muslim countries that have established a well-
institutionalized fatwa are experiencing fewer cases or no cases of religious fundamentalism and 
terrorism within their domain.”91 Chiroma et al. do not provide evidence to substantiate this bold 
claim. The chief issue, however, is the authors disconnect from research showing that religious 
scholars who form close relationships with the government create a negative perception for the 
members of the religion. Establishment scholars, who can also issue fatwas, are seen as having 
been “compromised by their alliance with corrupt secular regimes,” and are disparagingly 
referred to by the name ‘ualma al-Sultan, which means the ‘ulama of the regime. 92 In his study 
of Al Muhajiroun, a radical non-violent Islamist organization in the UK, Wiktoriwocz found that 
the argument most often used against other non-violent fundamentalists, both local and abroad, 
was that they were “tied to the Saudi government and therefore incapable of rendering 
independent judgments.”93 Moderates are similarly accused of being dependent on the 
government, typically Western democracies, such as the British government. While governments 
can certainly enforce fatwas like laws, this may come at the cost of the religious influence 
inherent to fatwas. 
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The two academics who have studied terror fatwas in detail, Bar and Weimann, have also 
examined extensively the topic of counter-terror fatwas, offering their respective takes on how 
counter-terror fatwas can be made more effective against Islamist terrorism. However, their work 
is also unhelpful in understanding why counter-terror fatwas have been ineffective against 
terrorism. According to Bar, it would take binding counter-terror fatwas “threatening hellfire” to 
undermine the radical narrative. 94 Although Bar does mention that counter-terror fatwas can be 
useful in declaring the duty of jihad does not exist, he primarily emphasizes counter-terror fatwas 
that threaten hellfire against terrorism as the better and ultimate response to Islamist terrorism. 
The main problem Bar faces is that he underestimates the difficulty of allowing counter-
terror fatwas to threaten hellfire against terrorism, although he acknowledges the unique 
particularities of Islam that would discourage it. 95 One such particularity is that Islam prohibits 
making false accusations of apostasy. 96 Another is the general disinclination to cause strife in the 
Muslim community. In Islam, civil strife (fitna) between Muslims is forbidden. To counter these 
issues, he argues that by reviving ijtihad97, the verses of the Qur’an can be reinterpreted to 
officially negate radical interpretations. Reinterpretation would allow them to declare the 
terrorists adhering to these now-defunct radical interpretations apostates, and charge them with 
causing strife. This would effectively make it permissible to threaten terrorists with hellfire.98 
But the gates of ijtihad were closed since the 10th century by early Islamic jurisprudence.99  Bar 
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acknowledges this, yet does not explain how the monumental task of reopening the gate can be 
accomplished.100 In fact, attempting to open the gate is a dangerous endeavour, as it implies 
questioning of the traditional principles of Shar’iah.101  
While Bar argues that binding counter-terror fatwas threatening hellfire would be a more 
effective response to Islamist terrorism, I argue instead that counter-terror fatwas could be made 
more effective against Islamist terrorism if they merely discussed—let alone challenged—the 
specific Qur’anic verses endorsing violence that are invoked to justify Islamist terrorism. The 
adab al-mufti, the code of conduct for fatwa issuers (muftis),102 states that while the content of 
fatwas can be “concise and informal”, they can also be “a fuller technical discussion.”103 
Considering that a fatwa’s authority is partially based on the “persuasiveness” of its content,104 it 
stands to reason that a counter-terror fatwa with sophisticated content would be more persuasive, 
and, by extension, hold more authority than a counter-terror fatwa without sophisticated content. 
Moreover, it stands to reason that a counter-terror fatwa that discusses the specific Qur’anic 
verses that endorse violence is more sophisticated than a counter-terror fatwa that cites verses 
that present Islam as a religion of peace. This case gains strength when these verses have 
conditions and limitations, and are neither unequivocal nor absolute pronouncements of peace 
(as described in more detail in the next chapter). By citing Qur’anic verses that only present 
Islam as a religion of peace, the counter-terror fatwa is unable to directly challenge, and 
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ultimately disrupt, the ideological core of Islamist terrorism. Instead, by challenging the Qur’anic 
verses endorsing violence that is used to justify Islamist terrorism, the counter-terror fatwa can 
best create doubt in the minds of potential Islamist terrorists inspired by such verses. According 
to Ed Husain, Quilliam’s Co-Founder and Co-Director, “where there is doubt, in Islamic 
religious behavior, there is avoidance,” and since Islamist terrorists “currently kill because they 
have certainty (yaqeen) of being rewarded in the next life (akhirah),” counter-terror fatwas citing 
Islamic texts can remove this certainty through doubt and ultimately prevent attacks from 
happening.105 
Weimann argues that the dissemination of counter-terror fatwas would make them more 
effective against Islamist terrorism. According to him, counter-terror fatwas receive “little media 
coverage” and are not “posted on the online platforms where most jihadi fatwas are”.106 
However, I argue that most counter-terror fatwas have received adequate media coverage.  As 
this paper later shows in Chapter 3, the vast majority of the counter-terror fatwas have received 
some media coverage. However, I argue that the counter-terror fatwas that challenge the specific 
Qur’anic verses endorsing violence are amongst the few that receive no media coverage. 
Weimann’s other argument, regarding the lack of dissemination of counterterror fatwas in the 
very online platforms where most terror fatwas are typically shared, is fair. However, we do not 
know if they are not being distributed in those platforms—there must be evidence proving this is 
the case. Moreover, Khomeini and even Bin Laden’s terror fatwas emerged in an age in which 
the internet was in its infancy, yet their fatwas managed to take the world by storm, and their 
fatwas were primarily disseminated through traditional forms of media.  
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During the research phase, I supplemented my research of counter-terror fatwas with the 
current literature on fatwas and terrorism. This research systematically investigates my thesis 
question: why are counter-terror fatwas ineffective against Islamist terrorism? However, before 
proceeding to the research findings, I describe the study’s methodology to demonstrate how the 
study investigated the question. The three parts are reviewed in the following order: 1) compiling 
a list of counter-terror fatwas; 2) analyzing counter-terror fatwas; and 3) conducting interviews.  
Compiling a List of Counter-Terror Fatwas 
 For the purposes of this research project, a broad definition of counter-terror fatwas is 
used in a consistent manner throughout this paper in order to avoid any sample selection bias. To 
define the term broadly, counter-terror fatwas are proclamations intended to challenge terrorism 
and/or terrorist organisations.  
This paper does not consider any counter-terror fatwas that only partially or indirectly 
challenge terrorism and/or terrorist organisations. An example of a project not included in the 
research is the 2004 Amman Message. Initially conceptualized in 2004 in Jordan by Abdullah II 
bin Al-Hussein, the Amman Message begun as a statement intending “to declare what Islam is 
and what it is not” and determine “what actions represent it and what actions do not.”107 
According to the Amman Message, “its goal was to clarify to the modern world the true nature of 
Islam and the nature of true Islam.”108 King Abdullah II asked 24 of the most senior Islamic 
scholars, who represented all sects and schools from across the world, the following three 
questions in a bid to bolster the statement’s religious authority: “(1) Who is a Muslim? (2) Is it 
																																																						





permissible to declare someone an apostate (takfir)? (3) Who has the right to undertake issuing 
fatwas (legal rulings)?”109 Following the 24 responses, in 2005, the King organized an 
International Islamic Conference and invited 200 of the top Islamic scholars from around the 
world; the scholars were unanimous in their ruling regarding the three questions:  
1. They specifically recognized the validity of all 8 Mathhabs (legal chools) of Sunni, 
Shi’a and Ibadhi Islam; of traditional Islamic Theology (Ash’arism)’ of Islamism 
Mysticism (Sufism), and of true Salafi thought, and came to a precise definition of 
who is a Muslim.  
2. Based upon this definition they forbade takfir (Declarations of apostasy) between 
Muslims.  
3. Based upon the Mathahib they set forth the subjective and objective preconditions for 
the issuing of fatwas, thereby exposing ignorant and illegitimate edicts in the name of 
Islam.110  
 
This fatwa was designed to be legally binding for all Muslims, and upon a cursory glance, its 
second point seems to have the hallmarks of a counter-terror fatwa. However, upon closer 
examination, this fatwa falls short of fully condemning terrorism against everyone; instead it 
merely forbids violence between Muslims based on the charges of apostasy. Because of this 
limitation, this fatwa was excluded from the compiled list of counter-terror fatwas examined by 
this paper. 
 This thesis also does not consider any counter-terror fatwas that rely on inaccurate 
definitions of terrorism or terrorist organizations. For example, in 2005, the Council of Muftis of 
the Chechen Republic issued a fatwa declaring jihad against Wahhabism.111 In speaking with 
journalists, Chechen Mufti Sulan Mirzev referred to Wahhabism as the “plague of the 20th and 
21st centuries” and that it was unanimously decided by Arab scholars that Muslims “fighting 
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against Wahhabism are on the path of jihad, following the way of Allah.”112 He explicitly refers 
to Wahhabis and terrorists as if they are equivalent categories, and while it is true that Wahhabi 
or Salafi jihadists exist, other major factions in these Wahhabi and Salafi groups are not 
violent.113 His identification of all Wahhabis as terrorists is an unconventional and incorrect 
label, forcing his fatwa to be excluded from this research paper.  
In creating a list of counter-terror fatwas issued to date, this research paper consulted 
with five English webpages that have compiled, to varying degrees of comprehension, Muslim 
statements against terrorism (see below). The statements compiled by these webpages included 
fatwas. Often, these pages had dead URLs for the fatwas they referenced. Some of these pages 
were created within a short time span, while others were regularly maintained by vigilant authors 
who kept abreast of developments on this topic. However, these four pages were used and cross-
referenced with one another to help this research project create a comprehensive collection of 
counter-terror fatwas, making the list of counter-terror fatwas compiled for this research project 
the first of its kind.  
Among the four webpages consulted, one was created by the University of Melbourne’s 
National Centre of Excellence for Islamic Studies, specifically the National Imams Consultative 
Forum Initiative, which has a page dedicated to fatwas, rulings, and other authoritative 
statements.114  While the page lists counter-terror fatwas, it also includes other kinds of 
statements as well. This list covers some statements and fatwas issued from 1999 to 2010, but the 
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list is not fully comprehensive. In addition, some links are broken, and the page does not indicate 
any signs of regular maintenance during the time span mentioned; instead, all statements appear 
to be posted within a short time span.  
 The next webpage that compiles Muslim statements against terrorism is created by the 
agency Ontario Consultants on Religious Tolerance.115 Religious Tolerance is an independently-
funded multi-faith agency operated by members of different faiths that writes articles about 
religion, morality, and ethics. Their webpage documents Muslim statements against terrorism, 
covering the years between 2001 and 2014. In its relatively sparse list of statements, it contains 
even fewer fatwas against terrorism. This webpage does not appear to be regularly maintained 
during the time span mentioned; instead, the webpage and its content were created within a short 
time span. There are some broken links, but its problems are not as severe as the University of 
Melbourne’s webpage.    
 Another webpage dedicated to statements against terrorism is by an anonymous Muslim 
convert of European-American heritage.116 Titled “Muslims Condemn Terrorist Attacks,” this 
webpage focuses on statements against the attacks of 9/11, as well as terrorist incidents that 
occurred afterward. This page has been comprehensive in bringing light to many statements 
against the 9/11 attack, however, the webpage displays minimal coverage of statements against 
terrorist attacks other than 9/11. Moreover, few fatwas were mentioned, and those mentioned 
were rife with dead URLS—thankfully the writers provided adequate enough descriptions for 
these listings to conduct independent searches. Another issue with the website is that the writer 
fails to provide explicitly the time span of the statements purportedly covered by the 
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compilation; however, judging by its latest entry, it seems the webpage appears to be last 
updated in 2007.  
 One of the more prominent webpages consulted during the writing of this paper, is the 
Islamic Statements against Terrorism by Charles Kurzman, a sociology professor at the 
University of North Carolina and the co-director of the Carolina Center for the Study of the 
Middle East and Muslim Civilizations.117 His compilation of Muslim statements against 
terrorism spans the years between 2001 and 2010, but the compilation is not fully 
comprehensive.118 To his credit, he manages to backup the statements, including fatwas, through 
the web archive.  
 The most prominent webpage of those surveyed is The American Muslim (TAM), an 
online publication that covers a variety of issues, namely those concerning Muslims in America. 
Its founding editor, Sheila Musaji, compiled statements and fatwas from the beginning of 2002 in 
mid 2015, and she actively maintained the webpage at this time.119 This compilation of 
statements and fatwas against terrorism is the most comprehensive, successfully recording ones 
mentioned in the other three compilations. Musaji’s collection of statements against terrorism, 
including fatwas, played a key role in my own compilation of counter-terror fatwas.  
 Online news was used to bridge the gaps in coverage left by TAM. Since the compilation 
was officially maintained until 5/13/2015, this research project has relied on the English news, 
particularly online news, to access any fatwas issued since that date. The author, who was 
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interested in this research topic for quite some time, had been bookmarking whichever counter-
terror fatwas received media attention. Also, with a plethora of news outlets from across the 
world having successfully adopted the online format, the task of bridging the gap with the digital 
medium for the past two years was effortless, especially when using Google News, a digital 
news hub that provides comprehensive coverage, aggregated from news outlets all over the 
world.  
 Online news and webpages also were used independently to verify the counter-terror 
fatwas extracted from the above compilations. Conducting these confirmations helps ensure the 
accuracy of the paper’s compilation of counter-terror fatwas. For instance, TAM’s compilation 
lists a fatwa against suicide terrorist attacks as being issued by Saudi Arabia’s Shaykh Abd al-
Aziz bin Abdallah al Shaykh. Upon independent verification however, this was confirmed as 
merely a statement. In TAM’s defense, other sites also mislabelled the statement. In fact, the 
mistake’s origins can be traced back to a policy analysis paper published by The Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy in 2011, which examined this “fatwa” and was even titled, “The 
Saudi Fatwa against Suicide Terrorism.” 120 In this policy analysis paper, Reuven Paz notes that 
when the newspaper Sharq al-Awsat asked the Shaykh for his view on the different 
manifestations of Islamist terrorisms, the Shaykh provided his view on the different 
manifestations, such as suicide terrorism, to which he specifically stated, “What you call suicide 
bombings in my view are illegitimate and have nothing to do with jihad in the cause of God. I am 
afraid it is another form of killing oneself.”121 Paz explicitly admits that this statement is not a 
fatwa, yet he tries to misconstrue it as one: “his reply was not formally an official Islamic ruling 
																																																						






(fatwa), but since such rulings are answers by high religious authorities to questions, his 
interview was received in the Arab world as if he had issued a fatwa.”122 With Paz’s crucial 
admission that this statement is not technically a fatwa, one wonders why the paper’s title 
implies otherwise. To be clear, Paz does not provide evidence to corroborate his claim that the 
Shayks statement was perceived to be a fatwa by the Arab world.  
 Secondary sources, while limited, were also used to create the list of counter-terror 
fatwas. Bar and Weimann’s research on this topic has mentioned a few counter-terror fatwas, 
some of which overlapped with TAM’s compilation of counter-terror fatwas. The counter-terror 
fatwas that fell outside the TAM compilation typically involved Salafists as issuers, such as 
Abdullah bin Jibreen and Nasser al-Omar’s fatwas against Hizbollah during its war with Israel in 
2006.123 
 When scanning the above sources, this research project focused specifically on mentions 
of the term “fatwa” and its various synonyms. Explicitly, the term “fatwa” was used throughout 
the majority of the sources. Implicitly, synonymous terms were used in the place of a fatwa, such 
as edict, verdict, and declaration, and while this was a rare occurrence, in order to maintain 
accuracy in my research, I sought other news sources to confirm that they were indeed fatwas. 
 I encountered certain limitations when compiling the first collection of counter-terror 
fatwa documents. The most significant limitation is that some counter-terror fatwas could not be 
found. This can be attributed to a variety of factors. One factor is some counter-terror fatwas are 
provided orally, instead of in writing. While most counter-terror fatwas have been provided 
through writing, a choice few were provided orally. Since audio recordings generally take more 
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effort to conduct, preserve, and share than textual documents, counter-terror fatwas issued orally 
are much harder to locate. 
Another factor that contributes to missing counter-terror fatwas is that they were issued in 
countries where English is not the primary language. Sometimes these counter-terror fatwas are 
not translated into English, but this limitation is not as compromising as it seems. Typically, 
these counter-terror fatwas are reported in the country’s native language(s) by the news outlets. 
However, these counter-terror fatwas tend to be reported in English as well, either by news 
outlets that report in English, or by foreign correspondents from major English news outlets. 
Moreover, these news coverages typically provide essential details about the counter-terror 
fatwas; they provide enough to perform independent searches in the native language to track 
down the fatwa document and translate it into English. 
 A factor that further contributes to missing counter-terror fatwas is that the dated URLs 
for the fatwa documents often no longer work. Counter-terror fatwas that were previously 
accessible, had become inaccessible by the time this research was compiled. I surmounted this 
issue by using the Google search engine to track down other webpages which had successfully 
documented the counter-terror fatwas.  
 In addition to the previous factors, sometimes the counter-terror fatwas were unavailable 
to the public. For example, Saudi Arabia’s Shaykh Abd al-Aziz bin Abadallah Al Shaykh, the 
Grand Mufti of the Senior Ulema Council whose statement against suicide attacks has been 
discussed earlier in this section, is reported to have released a fatwa against terrorism in 2004. 
The Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia,124 which shares items to the English-speaking public, had 
at one point hosted a document titled, “Public Statements by Senior Saudi Officials Condemning 
																																																						




Extremism and Promoting Moderation,” that included this fatwa against terrorism.125 However, 
it is no longer part of the website.126 Thankfully, copies of the document are available via the 
internet, and Kurzman and other vigilant individuals have archived the document a total of 66 
times.127 It is entirely plausible that the Saudi Embassy webpage may have been revised and 
items, such as this document, may have been inadvertently discarded. This scenario seems quite 
unlikely, however, considering the embassy website continues to carry a long list of items 
published both before and after the document.  
Another example of a counter-terror fatwa no longer available to the public involves 
Imam Syed Soharwardy, the founder of the Supreme Council of Canada. He has issued three 
counter-terror fatwas to date, yet only hosts two of them on his webpage, namely the fatwa on 
joining ISIS and the fatwa on terrorism in Canada and the US, issued in 2015 and 2010 
respectively.128 His fatwa on fighting against the Taliban, issued in 2009, is not there. In fact, I 
was unaware of the existence of this counter-terror fatwa and only learned about it through an 
interview with Soharwardy.129 News articles covering this counter-terror fatwa are 
inaccessible.130 Shortly after, this research author emailed Soharwardy asking why this particular 
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fatwa against Taliban is not on his webpage, but received no response. Subsequently this author 
purchased Soharwardy’s book through Amazon to access the fatwa.131 
  Sometimes sources that make reference to the existence of counter-terror fatwas are 
themselves problematic. In his book Warrant for Terror, Bar discusses a group of opposition 
scholars who have issued a counter-terror fatwa in response to the terrorist attacks in Saudi 
Arabia in 2004, but only lists their names in the footnotes.132 I was unable to find this counter-
terror fatwa, and, as a result, I contacted Bar through email asking for further elaboration on this 
fatwa, but received no response. 
Analyzing Counter-Terror Fatwas 
 Up to this point, I have discussed which counter-terror fatwas were collected and how, as 
well as certain limitations that prevented me from developing a complete list of all counter-terror 
fatwas issued to date. Now, I examine how this list of counter-terror fatwas is analyzed. To 
reiterate, my paper’s objective is to investigate why counter-terror fatwas have not been effective 
in deterring terrorism and terrorist organizations. I argue that counter-terror fatwas have not been 
effective because the fatwas’ content is rarely sophisticated. At most, they cite verses that present 
Islam as a religion of peace to justify their positions, but still neglect to discuss or challenge the 
specific Qur’anic verses that endorse the violence used to justify Islamic terrorism. I also argue 
that counter-terror fatwas that are not sophisticated receive some news coverage, but 
sophisticated counter-terror fatwas receive little to none. 
Although Shia fatwas are investigated, I intend to closely examine only Sunni fatwas. 
The authority of Sunni fatwas is derived partially from its persuasiveness, a stark contrast to Shia 
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fatwas, which derived their authority entirely from the issuer (this idea will be examined in more 
detail in Chapter 4). An excellent example of the authority of Shia fatwas being derived from the 
issuer is provided by Shaykh Shafiq Hudda, from the Islamic Humanitarian Service. He recounts 
the story of Ayatollah Mirza Shirazi, who issued a fatwa “a century ago, when the British were 
loading tobacco into the Middle East.” The fatwa was “just one line, [saying] that partaking or 
smoking tobacco is equivalent to fighting against the imam of the time, Imam Mahdi.”133 
Apparently, the authority of this fatwa was powerful enough that even the Shah of Iran was 
denied tobacco by his own wife. 
As for analyzing the content of counter-terror fatwas, the task is relatively straight-
forward. The content of counter-terror fatwas is searched for mentions of the specific Qur’anic 
verses that endorse violence and are typically used to justify Islamist terrorism. Which specific 
Qur’anic verses endorse violence and are cited by Islamist terrorists? This question is answered 
by Donald Holbrook, a scholar of terrorism and political violence, in “Using the Qur’an to 
Justify Terrorist Violence: Analysing Selective Application of the Qur’an in English-Language 
Militant Islamist Discourse.”134 In the article, he identifies specific Qur’anic verses that are 
invoked in a selection of popular radical Islamist publications. He affirms that the article focuses 
“only on Qur’anic verses explicitly endorsing violence or fighting, which militant Islamists have 
sought to use in their messaging to encourage consumers of this material to support violent 
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jihad.”135 The popular radical Islamist literature he uses consists of 30 texts in total, which are 
either in English or translated into it.136  
Holbrook found the following Qur’anic verses used to justify and promote terrorism:  
An-Nisā (4): 74-76 Those who barter the life of this world for the next should fight in the 
way of God. And we shall bestow on him who fights in the way of God, whether he is 
killed or is victorious, a glorious reward.  
 
What has come upon you that you fight not in the cause of God and for the oppressed, men, 
women and children, who pray: "Get us out of this city, O Lord, whose people are 
oppressors; so send us a friend by Your will, and send us a helper."  
 
Those who believe fight in the way of God; and those who do not, only fight for the powers 
of evil; so you should fight the allies of Satan. Surely the stratagem of Satan is ineffective. 
[Used in 9 of the texts]  
 
An-Nisā (4): 84 So fight on in the way of God (irrespective of others). You cannot compel 
any one except your own self; but urge the believers to fight. It may well be that God will 
keep back the might of the infidels, for God's might is greater, and severe His punishment. 
[Used in 6 of the texts] 
 
At-Taubah (9): 5 But when these months, prohibited (for fighting), are over, slay the 
idolaters wheresoever you find them, and take them captive or besiege them, and lie in wait 
for them at every likely place. But if they repent and fulfil their devotional obligations and 
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pay the zakat, then let them go their way, for God is forgiving and kind. [Used in 5 of the 
texts] 
 
At-Taubah (9): 38-39 What happened to you, O believers, that when you are asked to set 
out in the cause of God your feet begin to drag? Do you find the life of the world so pleasing 
that you forget the life to come? Yet the profit of the life of this world is but meagre as 
compared to the life to come. 
  
Unless you go out (to strive), God will inflict grievous punishment on you, and bring other 
people in your place, and you will not be able to harm Him in the least, for God has the 
power over all things. [Used in 5 of the texts] 
 
At-Taubah (9): 111 God has verily bought the souls and possessions of the faithful in 
exchange for a promise of Paradise. They fight in the cause of God, and kill and are killed. 
This is a promise incumbent on Him, as in the Torah, so the Gospel and the Qur'an. And 
who is more true to his promise than God? So rejoice at the bargain you have made with 
Him; for this will be triumph supreme. [Used in 5 of the texts] 
 
At-Taubah (9): 13-15 Will you not fight those who broke the pledge and plotted to banish 
the Apostle, and who were the first to attack you? Are you afraid of them? If you are 
believers you should fear God more.  
 
Fight them so that God may punish them at your hands, and put them to shame, and help 
you against them, and heal the wounds of the hearts of believers,  
 
And remove the anger from their breast; for God turns to whosoever desires. [Used in 5 of 
the texts] 
 
Al-Baqarah (2): 190-191 Fight those in the way of God who fight you, but do not be 
aggressive: God does not like aggressors.  
 
And fight those (who fight you) wheresoever you find them, and expel them from the place 
they had turned you out from. Oppression is worse than killing. Do not fight them by the 
Holy Mosque unless they fight you there. If they do, then slay them: Such is the requital 
for unbelievers. [Used in 4 of the texts] 
 
Al-Baqarah (2): 216 Enjoined on you is fighting, and this you abhor. You may dislike a 
thing yet it may be good for you; or a thing may haply please you but may be bad for you. 
Only God has knowledge, and you do not know. [Used in 4 of the texts] 
 
Al-Hajj (22): 39-40 Permission is granted those (to take up arms) who fight because they 
were oppressed. God is certainly able to give help to those  
 
who were driven away from their homes for no other reason than they said: "Our Lord is 
God." And if God had not restrained some men through some others, monasteries, 




been razed. God will surely help those who help Him, - Verily God is all-powerful and all-
mighty. [Used in 4 of the texts] 
 
Al-Anfāl (8): 39 So, fight them till all opposition ends, and obedience is wholly God's. If 
they desist then verily God sees all they do. [Used in 3 of the texts]137  
 
The content of the counter-terror fatwas is examined to see if they mention any of the above 
Qur’anic verses, and if they discuss or challenge the interpretation of those verses.   
 Analyzing counter-terror fatwas for their digital news coverage is also straight forward. 
The Google search engine and the Google News database help show the existence of any online 
English news articles that cover the release of counter-terror fatwas. Because of its immense 
search capabilities, it is easy to discern which fatwas received news coverage online (with the 
minimum requirement of there being a single news article) and those that did not receive any.  
 A four-way typology is used to classify the counter-terror fatwas according to their 
content’s levels of sophistication and degree of news exposure. Granted, these counter-terror 
fatwas can be analyzed using other variables, however, the two aspects of content sophistication 
and online news coverage provide useful analysis for understanding why counter-terror fatwas 
have been ineffective against Islamist terrorism. 
Conducting Interviews 
This research project also makes use of interviews with the counter-terror fatwa issuers. 
These are instrumental in providing clues about why counter-terror fatwas have not been 
effective against Islamist terrorism and terrorist organizations. I interviewed four counter-terror 
fatwa issuers and two individuals who are knowledgeable on the topic of fatwas. The contact 
information for all the individuals interviewed were found through their respective personal and 
																																																						





organizational websites or social media accounts, such as Twitter and Facebook. The format of 
the interviews differed slightly for the two groups. For counter-terror fatwa issuers, two types of 
procedures were used: semi-structured telephone interviews and email questionnaires. Semi-
structured telephone interviews consist of a standard set of questions as well as an open-ended 
discussion to flesh out responses and discover new information. Typically, these interviews are 
approximately 45-60 minutes in length. If no phone number is listed or provided, a mail-back 
questionnaire is sent to the email address of the counter-terror fatwa issuer. For individuals with 
knowledge on the topic of fatwas, two types of procedures are used: semi-structured telephone 
interviews and semi-structured in-person interviews. The format for the semi-structured 
telephone interviews is identical to the ones used for counter-terror fatwa issuers. The format for 
semi-structured in-person interviews is similar to telephone interviews: they were 45-60 minutes 
in length, and consist of a standard set of questions as well as an open-ended discussion portion 
designed to collect more information. Semi-structured in-person interviews are preferred for 
individuals living nearby.  
In terms of limitations there were a few regarding the interviews. While I intended to 
interview more counter-terror fatwa issuers, some of the counter-terror fatwa issuers were unable 
to speak English, so I could not communicate with them and gain the necessary information. 
Sometimes the counter-terror fatwa issuers’ contact information could not be found; this could 
have been because the issuers intentionally made it unavailable to the public, or because the 
issuers simply do not interact with the public and have not created personal webpages and/or 
maintained an active presence on social media. Sometimes issuers would not respond to either 
email or phone requests to speak on the matter. Other times they would respond, showing initial 




Chapter 3: Counter-Terror Fatwas Study Data 
This research project identifies 52 counter-terror fatwas that have been issued between 
1998 and 2017 from all across the world.138 However, as explained in the Methodology section, 
Shia counter-terror fatwas are excluded from the research samples, and this decision brings the 
number of counter-terror fatwas down to 50. With that said, before proceeding with the 
examination of the content and the media coverage of Sunni counter-terror fatwas, I briefly 
investigate Shia counter-terror fatwas and examine how the particularities of this sect, namely its 
centralized authority, may actually help them counter terrorism more effectively.   
Shia Counter-terror Fatwas  
To date only two Shia counter-terror fatwas has been issued; however, the authenticity of 
one of the two is dubious.139 This particular Shia counter-terror fatwa was covered by the Iranian 
newspaper Rooz Online in 2006.140 The news article states, in the Farsi-language subheading, 
that Ayatollah Sanei issued a fatwa against suicide operations. According to the article, 
Ayatollah Yousef Sanei, who was being interviewed by Christiane Amanpour from CNN news, 
stated that killing humans is the greatest crime in Islam, and those who commit suicide bombing 
reside at the bottom of hell. While he cautions that the debate about killing in defence is different 
from the talk of terrorism, he emphasizes that the prohibition of suicide bombing is not up for 
debate. Issues that call into question the fatwa’s authenticity begin with the fact that this 
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information about the fatwa was gleaned from an archived version of the article, independent 
from the newspaper and the article no longer exists in Rooz Online itself. To make things more 
dubious, no record of this interview with CNN can be located. Moreover, the fact that no other 
media outlets provided coverage for a high-profile figure’s statements on the topic of suicide 
terrorism warrants some scepticism. Finally, the statements attributed to Ayatollah Sanei puts 
him at odds with the highly-revered Grand Ayatollah Khomeini. Grand Ayatollah Khomeini had 
previously used his religious authority to distinguish praiseworthy acts of self-sacrifice from 
condemnable acts of suicide; based on this assertion, suicide attacks, such as suicide bombing are 
permissible and can become acts that guarantee entry into heaven.141   
As for the second Shia counter-terror fatwa, it may have been effective in responding to 
terrorism. After consulting with the highest Shia authority in Iraq, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, 
Shia leaders held a conference in Montreal to tell followers that “they are bound by a fatwa to 
respect the laws of Canada.”142 This was in response to the failed terrorist bomb plot in Ontario 
by 17 people, whom prosecutors at the time had alleged were inspired by Al-Qaeda and its 
attacks in the West.143 News articles unanimously report the fatwa stating the following: 
“Muslims have undertaken to obey the laws of the country of their residence and thus they must 
be faithful to that undertaking.”144 I tried to locate the actual counter-terror fatwa document in a 
bid to ensure there was nothing more involved. Since Sayed Nabil Abbas, the Canadian delegate 
of Ali Sistani, sought this advice from Sistani’s representatives,145 I tried to contact him for a 
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copy and an interview. Both were promised, but I was ultimately unsuccessful in securing either. 
However, I did manage to find a similar fatwa on Ali Sistani’s official website, particularly in its 
wording that dictates Shia Muslim interaction with laws in non-Muslim countries. 146 Prompted 
by a follower’s question on whether it is necessary to abide by the laws of a non-Muslim country 
if someone has been granted a visa with them, the fatwa states: 
If he has given an undertaking—even if indirectly [as is implied in the immigration 
documents]—to abide by the laws of that country, it is necessary for him to fulfill his 
commitment in issues that are not contrary to the sacred laws [of Islam]. As for example, 
it is necessary to obey traffic regulations regardless [of the fact whether you have given a 
commitment or not], if not obeying those rules could eventually lead to harming people’s 
lives and properties which are sacrosanct [In Islamic laws]. 147  
 
Here we can see the content of the counter-terror fatwa to be brief and unsophisticated, and 
merely dictates to Shia Muslims the proper interaction with laws in non-Muslim countries. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, it is not uncommon for Shia fatwas to be short, for they 
derive their authority from the issuer, which in this case is the Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani.  
But what truly differentiates the Shia sect from Sunni in reference to fatwas, and what 
does this mean for Ayatollah Sistani’s fatwa above? Shaykh Shafiq Hudda of the Islamic 
Humanitarian Service answers these questions in an interview. While fatwas remain the same for 
both the Sunni and Shia sects of Islam, the question of who may issue one differentiates the two 
sects. In the case of Sunni Islam, they can be issued by any Islamic scholar. In Shia Islam, 
however, “it is not something that just anybody can issue.”148 “Any scholar, any minister of 
religion, imam, sheikh, syed who is a qualified scholar, can issue naseeha, which means advice, a 
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recommendation”, but they cannot issue fatwas. He explains the sharp difference between imams 
and ayatollahs in reference to the issuing of fatwas:  
Only senior scholars whom we refer to as ayatollah or a grand or mujtahid or Grand 
Ayatollah, and they’re the only ones entitled to issue a fatwa, a fatwa that would be a 
binding ruling on their followers, so this is where we see the difference between a normal 
and ordinary scholar or an imam in a respective city or situation has his limitations, whereas 
a Grand Ayatollah, or somebody who has done ijtihad, which is the study of Islamic 
sciences, to a senior level where they can deduce Islamic law, that process of ijtihad makes 
one a mujtahid or as you would see in the media referred to as Ayatollah, so you’ve got 
Ayatollah Khamenei, the current ruler of Iran, you have Ayatollah Sistani, a very 
influential force in Najaf in Iraq, and there’s about eight, seven or eight, very well-known 
prominent mujtahids who are qualified to issue fatawah’s, which is the plural of fatwa.149 
 
Essentially, in Shia Islam, only the central authority, such as the grand ayatollah, is permitted to 
issue fatwas. According to Shaykh Hudda, this system works to limit the power wielded by the 
common man because “If you start decentralizing, giving everybody authority to issue fatwas 
and to make their own, you know, decisions,” he says, “you can imagine the chaos that the 
society, the community, would have.” 150  
What does this mean for Grand Ayatollah Sistani’s fatwa? As it turns out, the sects’ 
central control of fatwas, namely the grand ayatollahs whom Shia Muslims are supposed to 
follow, may well contribute to their greater effectiveness in responding to terrorism. According 
to Shaykh Shafiq Hudda, Ayatollah Sistani’s fatwa “played a very important role in basically 
differentiating the Shia community from the others.” 151 He added in the interview that this 
particular fatwa “has been a very important part of our [their] own community’s fabric here in 
North America and in Europe and that’s why you will never have a Shia cleric or a Shia Imam 
ever telling anybody to go and hurt or blow up or kill anybody who doesn’t agree with you.” 152 
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Ayatollah Ali Sistani’s fatwa may very well have prevented terrorist attacks by Shia Muslims in 
the US and Canada. Certainly, no such attacks have taken place since the fatwa was issued.  
Sunni Counter-terror Fatwas 
Sunni counter-terror fatwas are now closely examined. Out of the 50 Sunni counter-terror 
fatwas I have identified, only 36 fatwa documents could be found.153 A four-way typology is 
used to classify the available fatwas in reference to their content’s levels of sophistication and 
degree of news exposure (see Figure 1). While these counter-terror fatwas can be analyzed using 
other variables, the two aspects of content sophistication and online news coverage provide 
useful analysis for understanding why counter-terror fatwas have ineffective against Islamist 
terrorism. In this four-way typology, counter-terror fatwas are categorized into one of the 
following categories: quadrant 1, counter-terror fatwas that discuss and challenge at least one of 
the specific Qur’anic verses invoked to justify Islamic terrorism, and which also receive some 
news coverage (with at least one news article that reported on the fatwa); quadrant 2, counter-
terror fatwas that cite verses that present Islam as a religion of peace to justify their position, and 
also receive some news coverage (with at least one news article that reported on the fatwa); 
quadrant 3, counter-terror fatwas that discuss and challenge at least one of the specific Qur’anic 
verses invoked to justify Islamic terrorism , and which receive no news coverage (with no news 
articles that reported on the fatwa); and quadrant 4, counter-terror fatwas that cite verses that 
present Islam as a religion of peace to justify their position, and which receive no news coverage 
(with no news articles that reported on the fatwa). The findings of this research show the 
lopsided distribution of the 36 counter-terror fatwas: quadrant 1 had 0 counter-terror fatwas; 
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quadrant 2 had 28 counter-terror fatwas; quadrant 3 had 5 counter-terror fatwas; and, quadrant 4 
had 3 counter-terror fatwas (see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 1. Typology classifying counter-terror fatwas based on the sophistication of its content 
and its news coverage online. 
 





A counter-terror fatwa is examined to illustrate each fatwas category. I start with a 
descriptive review of the fatwa, then proceed to analyze its content and level of media coverage. 
This examination is complemented by interview data that explains the lopsided distribution of 
counter-terror fatwas among the categories.  
Quadrant 1 (Widely Disseminated and Sophisticated Counter-Terror 
Fatwas)  
Out of the 36 counter terror fatwa documents examined, this research found 0 counter-
terror fatwas that discussed or challenged at least one of the specific Qur’anic verses endorsing 
violence that are typically invoked to justify Islamist terrorism, and also received some news 
coverage.  
Quadrant 2 (Widely Disseminated and Unsophisticated Counter-Terror 
Fatwas) 
 Out of the 36 counter-terror fatwas examined, 28 cited verses that present Islam as a 
religion of peace to justify their position and received some news coverage, with at least one 
news article that reported on the fatwa. An excellent example of a counter-terror fatwa in this 
category was issued in 2010 by the Pakistani Islamic scholar Dr. Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri, the 
founder of Minhaj-ul-Quran International, an Islamic movement from the Sufi tradition spanning 
90 countries.154 In a news conference held in London, England, Qadri discussed his 600-page 
fatwa155, named Fatwa on Terrorism and Suicide Bombings, with an audience comprised of 
“Muslims, clergy, MPs, police officers and other security officials.”156 At the conference, he 
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stated that his fatwa unequivocally denounced terrorism and suicide bombings committed in the 
name of Islam.157 He stated, “Terrorism is terrorism, violence is violence, and it has no place in 
Islamic teaching, and no justification can be provided for it, or any kind of excuses or ifs or buts. 
Good intentions cannot convert a wrong into good; they cannot convert an evil into good.”158 He 
adds, “they [terrorists] can’t claim that their suicide bombings are martyrdom operations and that 
they become the heroes of the Muslm Umma [global brotherhood]. No, they become heroes of 
hellfire, and they are leading towards hellfire.”159 
Qadri publicly differentiates his counter-terror fatwa from others issued in the past, 
saying that while they may be similar, his fatwa omits the “ifs and buts” that are commonly 
found in other fatwas.160 He also claims that his counter-terror fatwa offers a “theological 
rebuttal of every argument used by al-Qaeda inspired recruiters.” 161 In a telephone interview 
with CNN, he adds, “Until now, scholars who were condemning terrorism were conditional and 
qualified what they said. I didn’t leave a single, minor aspect that, in the mind of radicals or 
extremists, can take them to the direction of martyrdom.”162 
Not only did this counter-terror fatwa get publicized at a media conference and receive 
copious media coverage from prominent news outlets, it also received powerful praise. 
According to the London-based Quilliam counter-extremism think tank, “this fatwa has the 
potential to be a highly significant step towards eradicating Islamist terrorism.”163 Others praised 
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the fatwa for the “sophistication” of its content. Manan Ahmed, assistant professor of Islam in 
South and Southeast Asia at the Institute for Islamic Studies in Berlin, said this about the 
counter-terror fatwa:  
This is a landmark theological study – a careful and systematic treatment of a thousand 
years of legal tradition dealing with armed resistance against the state, rules of engagement, 
aspects. The fatwa itself […] is categorically and comprehensively against terrorism in any 
form and for any cause.164  
 
Professor John L. Esposito, professor of Religion and International Affairs and of Islamic 
Studies at Georgetown University, remarked that “Qadri’s fatwa is an exhaustive, systematic, 
theological and legal study of the Islamic tradition’s teachings on the use of force and armed 
resistance to support an absolute condemnation of any form of terrorism for any cause.” 165 There 
are even more praises for this fatwa, too many to list.  
In many words, Qadri and others have praised the Fatwa on Terrorism and Suicide 
Bombings for its thoroughness in condemning terrorism. From an academic point of view, I must 
ask, how does it hold up in terms of discussing or challenging specific Qur’anic verses that 
endorse violence and are invoked to justify Islamic terrorism? As it turns out—not well. The 



























Table 1. Identifying the Qur’anic verses typically invoked to justify terrorism in 
Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri's Fatwa on Terrorism and Suicide Bombings. 
With regard to: 
2:190-191 “Fight those in the way of God who fight you, but do not be aggressive: God 
does not like aggressors. 
 
And fight those (who fight you) wheresoever you find them, and expel them from the place 
they had turned you out from. Oppression is worse than killing. Do not fight them by the 
Holy Mosque unless they fight you there. If they do, then slay them: Such is the requital 
for unbelievers.”  
 
This counter-terror fatwa only mentions a part of verse 2:191, not the complete verse. It fails to 
mention the other part of the verse that says, “And fight those (who fight you) wheresoever you 
find them, and expel them from the place they turned you out from.”166   
Despite the high praise received by Qadri and other scholars for this fatwa’s supposed 
complete condemnation of all forms of terrorism, it fails to challenge directly the jihadist 
interpretation of Qur’anic verses used to justify terrorism. And this crucial point is true for most 
counter-terror fatwas examined. They are similar to Qadri’s fatwa, in that they do not discuss or 






Quadrant 3 (Narrowly Disseminated and Sophisticated Counter-Terror 
Fatwas) 
 Out of the 36 counter terror fatwa documents examined, 5 counter-terror fatwas discussed 
or challenged at least one specific Qur’anic verse, and received no news coverage. An excellent 
example of a counter-terror fatwa that falls within this category was issued in 1998 by Lebanese-
American Shaykh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani, the Chariman of the Islamic Supreme Council 
of America, and Shaykh Seraj Hendricks, the Head Mufti in Cape Town, South Africa. It was 
entitled, “Jihad: A Misunderstood Concept from Islam.”167 This counter-terror fatwa provides the 
“context and circumstances of the Qur’anic revelations and the Hadith” to best understand the 
concept of jihad.168 Like Qadri, Shaykh Hisham Kabbani is influential within a particular 
segment of the global Sufi community, allegedly serving as a spiritual guide for close to two 
million Muslims throughout the world, mostly from the United States, England, and Southeast 
Asia.169 Again, we must ask, how does this counter-terror fatwa hold up in terms of discussing or 
challenging the specific Qur’anic verses that endorse violence and are invoked to justify Islamic 
terrorism? The threshold for this category is low; it must mention only one of the Qur’anic verses 
to meet the criteria, and the counter-terror fatwa met these criteria remarkably well. As with 
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Table 2. Identifying the Qur’anic verses typically invoked to justify terrorism in Shaykh 
Muhammad Hisham Kabbani and Shaykh Seraj Hendrics’ Fatwa, titled Jihad: A Misunderstood 
Concept from Islam. 
With regard to:  
4:74-76 “Those who barter the life of this world for the next should fight in the way of 
God. And we shall bestow on him who fights in the way of God, whether he is killed or is 
victorious, a glorious reward 
 
What has come upon you that you fight not in the cause of God and for the oppressed, men, 
women and children, who pray: "Get us out of this city, O Lord, whose people are 
oppressors; so send us a friend by Your will, and send us a helper 
 
Those who believe fight in the way of God; and those who do not, only fight for the powers 
of evil; so you should fight the allies of Satan. Surely the stratagem of Satan is ineffective.”  
 
This counter-terror fatwa refers to 4:75 and discusses its context. The counter-terror fatwa admits 
that after Prophet Muhammad’s time, the Muslims waged war “to establish the ‘Pax Islamica’ or 
Islamic Order.” 170 But the fatwa argues this was done because it guaranteed “the rights of every 
individual by keeping in check all the dark psychic tendencies of man and so preventing him 
from indulging in anti-social behaviors, from political aggression, right down to the commonest 
criminal act.”171 “It is for this,” the counter-terror fatwa argues, “that the Qur’an calls on the 
																																																						





believers to go forth in defense of those whose rights and liberty have been trampled by the 
unbridled tyranny of oppressors and conquering armies, or who are prevented from freely 
hearing the word of Allah espoused to them by preachers and educators.”172 On a final note, he 
adds, “No reliable evidence exists that Muslims ever intended or attempted to impose the 
specific rites and beliefs of Islam. The histories of Spain, India and the Balkans are concrete 
proof of this.”173  
With regard to: 
 
9:5 “But when these months, prohibited (for fighting), are over, slay the idolaters 
wheresoever you find them, and take them captive or besiege them, and lie in wait for them 
at every likely place. But if they repent and fulfil their devotional obligations and pay 
the zakat, then let them go their way, for God is forgiving and kind.”  
 
This counter-terror fatwa does more than mention this verse; it explains that unlike the majority 
opinion of the jurists, only Imam Shafi174 held that this verse supports jihad until all non-
Muslims convert to Islam or pay pay jiyza (poll tax).175 The counter-terror fatwa states that the 
majority of the jurists disagree with Shafi’s position, all relying on the succeeding verses as 
proof, such as 9:6, 9:7, and 9:8. These jurists cite verse 9:6, “‘and if anyone of the polytheists 
seeks your protection grant him protection…’” to argue that, as long as the polytheists “are 
submissive and willing to live peacefully among the believers,” Muslims are obligated to “treat 
them peacefully, despite their denial of Islam.” 176 The fatwa further states the following verse 




174 Shafi is the scholar who developed an approach within Islamic jurisprudence with its own interpretation of the 
Qur’an and verification of the Hadiths. The Shafi school was named after him, and is one of the four major schools 
of Sunni law. It is the second largest tradition, mainly found in Southeast Asia. See more at Abdullah Saeed, The 
Qur’an: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 2008), 17. 





unless the unbelievers break them first”, which is also reiterated in the next verse 9:8 “in which 
Allah orders us not to make a treaty with unbelieving enemies who break their oaths and whose 
intention is to overpower the Muslims.”177 The counter-terror fatwa adds rhetorically, “Had 
jihad’s objective been to fight all unbelievers, then there would have been no need for treaties 
and no differentiation between polytheists who remain loyal and faithful to their word and those 
who are treacherous.”178 Altogether, the counter-terror fatwa concludes, in response to verse 9:5, 
that fighting with the unbelievers should only occur in instances of broken agreements and 
aggression against Muslim territory. The fatwa stipulates: “Based on these arguments of the 
scholars, the majority concluded that physical fighting is not a permanent condition against 
unbelievers, but only when treaties are broken or aggression has been made against Muslim 
territory (dar al-Islam) by unbelievers.”179 
With regard to: 
 
9:13-15 “Will you not fight those who broke the pledge and plotted to banish the Apostle, 
and who were the first to attack you? Are you afraid of them? If you are believers you 
should fear God more. 
 
Fight them so that God may punish them at your hands, and put them to shame, and help 
you against them, and heal the wounds of the hearts of believers, 
 
And remove the anger from their breast; for God turns to whosoever desires.”  
 
This counter-terror fatwa mentions verse 9:13 and even discusses it, listing it as among the 
conditions needed to be satisfied in order to engage in violent jihad.180   










2:190-191 “Fight those in the way of God who fight you, but do not be aggressive: God 
does not like aggressors. 
 
And fight those (who fight you) wheresoever you find them, and expel them from the place 
they had turned you out from. Oppression is worse than killing. Do not fight them by the 
Holy Mosque unless they fight you there. If they do, then slay them: Such is the requital 
for unbelievers.” 
 
This counter-terror fatwa mentions 2:190 and even discusses it, listing it as among the conditions 
that must be satisfied to engage in violent jihad.181  
Shaykhs Kabbani and Hendricks’s counter-terror fatwa was successful in mentioning at 
least one specific Qur’anic verse that endorses violence invoked to justify Islamic terrorism. It 
more than met the criteria, addressing and discussing four of the above verses—and yet, this 
fatwa received no media coverage online. This unusual juxtaposition of the fatwa’s 
sophistication, particularly its persuasiveness, and its lack of media exposure reflects the same 
fate of four other counter-terror fatwas.  
Quadrant 4 (Narrowly Disseminated and Unsophisticated Counter-
Terror Fatwas) 
Out of the 36 counter-terror fatwas examined in this study, 3 cited verses that present 
Islam as a religion of peace to justify their position, and received no news coverage, with no 
news article that reported on the fatwa. An example of this type of counter-terror fatwa was 
issued by Darul Uloom Deoband, in India. This counter-terror fatwa is too short to search for the 
specific Qur’anic verses that endorse violence and are invoked to justify Islamic terrorism. 
Moreover, the counter-terror fatwa barely answers the question that prompted its issuance in the 
first place. The question is as follows: “What does the holy Qur’an say regarding the terrorists 






against our own country. How should they be treated? What should the general Muslims do if 
they have any information on such kind of people.”182 The fatwa simply answers, “Allah says in 
the Holy Qur’an: Take not life, which Allah hath made sacred. In Islam, it is haram to take the 
life of an innocent.”183 Setting the fact aside that the fatwa makes no reference to any of the 
specific Qur’anic verses that endorse violence, it does not deign to answer the questioner’s query 
regarding how terrorists should be treated, and what Muslims should do if they have information 
on these terrorists. Furthermore, the fatwa neglects to define what they deem an innocent life. 
This counter-terror fatwa did not have any media coverage.  
Citing Qur’anic Verses that Present Islam as a Religion of Peace  
 Counter-terror fatwas tend to cite popular Qur’anic verses that present Islam as a religion 
of peace to justify their position. However, even these verses that present Islam as a religion of 
peace have conditions and limitations. A good example of a counter-terror fatwa that relies on 
such verses is Qadri’s Fatwa on Terrorism and Suicide Bombings. Qadri’s counter-terror fatwa 
maintains the position that Islam does not permit any killings: “Islam not only outlaws the mass 
killings of Muslims but the whole of humanity, without any discrimination on the basis of caste, 
colour, race or religion.”184 To this end, he justifies his claim by citing Qur’anic verse 5:32, 
which equates the killing of a human with the killing of the human race: “Whoever kills a person 
[unjustly], except as a punishment for murder or [as prescribed punishment for bloodshed, 
robbery and spreading] disorder in the land, it is as if he killed all humanity.”185 However, Ibn 
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Warraq has previously argued that such words are quoted out of context. He provides the 
complete quote by citing Qur’anic verse 5:32 and 5:33:  
That was why We laid it down for the Israelites that whoever killed a human being, 
except as a punishment for murder or other villainy in the land, shall be looked upon as 
though he had killed all mankind: and that whoever saved a human life shall be regarded 
as though he had saved all mankind. [5:32] 
Our apostles brought them veritable proofs: yet it was not long before many of them 
committed great evils in the land.  
 
Those that make war against God and His apostle and spread disorder shall be put to 
death or crucified or have their hands and feet cut off on alternate sides, or be banished 
from the country.186 [5:33] 
 
According to Warraq, “the supposedly noble sentiments are in fact a warning to Jews. ‘Behave, 
or else’ is the message. Far from abjuring violence, these verses aggressively point out that 
anyone opposing the Prophet will be killed, crucified, mutilated, and banished!”187  
 In another example, Qadri claims that “Islam gives complete religious freedom to all non-
Muslim citizens to adhere to their respective faith traditions and to freely practise their 
teachings.”188 To this end, he cites Qur’anic verse 2:256:  
There is no compulsion in religion. Surely, right guidance is clearly distinguished from 
error.189  
 
However, according to Warraq, this verse is only applicable to Christians and Jews, and not 
Muslims and people of other religions.190  
  As can be seen from the above examples, Qur’anic verses that present Islam as a religion 
of peace come with conditions and limitations. These verses are not unequivocal in their 
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presenting of Islam as a religion of peace. This makes counter-terror fatwas that rely on such 
verses and their loopholes unable even to challenge Islamist terrorism indirectly because they do 
not contradict the Qur’anic verses endorsing violence that are typically used by terrorists to 
justify their actions. 
Why Are There Not More Sophisticated Counter-Terror Fatwas? 
As argued earlier in this thesis, counter-terror fatwas could be more effective against 
Islamist terrorism if they discussed or challenged the specific Qur’anic verses that endorse 
violence and are typically invoked to justify Islamic terrorism. The adab al-mufti, which is the 
code of conduct for fatwa issuers (muftis),191 states that while the content of fatwas can be 
“concise and informal”, they can also be “a fuller technical discussion.”192 Considering that a 
fatwa’s authority is based partially on the “persuasiveness” of its content,193 it stands to reason 
that a counter-terror fatwa with sophisticated content would be better received and adhered to, 
and by extension, hold more authority than a counter-terror fatwa lacking sophisticated content. 
Moreover, it stands to reason that a counter-terror fatwa that discusses and challenges the 
specific Qur’anic verses would be more sophisticated than a counter-terror fatwa that cites verses 
that present Islam as a religion of peace. This case gains strength when these verses have 
conditions and limitations, and are neither unequivocal nor absolute pronouncements of peace. 
By citing only Qur’anic verses that present Islam as a religion of peace, the counter-terror fatwa 
is unable to challenge directly, and ultimately disrupt, the ideological core of Islamist terrorism. 
Instead, by challenging the Qur’anic verses endorsing violence that is used to justify Islamist 
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terrorism, the counter-terror fatwa can best create doubt in the minds of potential Islamist 
terrorists inspired by such verses. According to Ed Husain, Quilliam’s Co-Founder and Co-
Director, “where there is doubt, in Islamic religious behavior, there is avoidance,” and since 
Islamist terrorists “currently kill because they have certainty (yaqeen) of being rewarded in the 
next life (akhirah),” counter-terror fatwas citing Islamic texts can remove this certainty through 
doubt and ultimately prevent attacks from happening.194 
 So why do most counter-terror fatwas not discuss at least one of the specific Qur’anic 
verses that endorse violence and are invoked to justify Islamic terrorism? Interviews with four 
issuers—three issuers of unsophisticated counter-terror fatwas with some news coverage and one 
issuer of a sophisticated counter-terror fatwa with no media coverage—help offer clues.  
One issuer explains that he deliberately designed short counter-terror fatwas because long 
counter-terror fatwas hold the interest of fewer people. Upon asking Syed Soharwardy, the 
president of the Islamic Supreme Council of Canada, why his fatwas – fatwa on joining ISIS195 
(2015) fatwa on Terrorism in Canada and the US196 (2010)  and fatwa on the Taliban197 (2009) – 
did not address those specific Qur’anic verses that endorse violence, he responded “we have 
done few198  because there are several verses for the Qur’an which people do misinterpret and so 
fatwa should not be a book, you know, because it will lose its effectiveness to be read by 
common people because if it becomes a book then only few people who will buy those books 
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read the entire book so that’s why we wanted to keep it few pages  with the two-three pages, four 
pages maximum, and so it can be read within a few minutes by the people who are trying to 
read.” “In fatwa making it a very large book it won’t be that effective, we want people to read it 
easily.” 199 
Soharwardy mentions, however, that he has challenged those specific Qur’anic verses 
that endorse violence, though not through fatwas. Referring to his book, Defeating Hate: A 
Comprehensive Rebuttal to Taliban, Al-Qaeda, Daesh (ISIS), & Islamaphobes, he states: “in this 
book I have responded to every verse that these terrorists use, saying Islam says go and kill all 
the Jews and Christians, Islam says go and kill, Qur’an says go and kill all the infidels, I have 
taken all those verses and explained to them that the interpretation or the translation of the 
extremists and Islamophobes both is not correct translation and neither correct interpretation.”200 
However, as shown in Appendix A, this book only discusses 5 out of the 17 specific Qur’anic 
verses that endorse violence and are typically used to justify Islamic terrorism. 
A different issuer argues there must be a counter-terror fatwa that challenges the specific 
Qur’anic verses that endorse violence, but he cannot issue one himself because it would be too 
long. Upon asking Usama Hasan, the head of Islamic Studies at Quilliam, why the fatwa on 
ISIS201 he issued did not discuss or challenge the specific Qur’anic verses that endorse violence, 
he said, “Right. Good question. That needs to be done, what you just alluded to. But, if I 
recorded it, that analysis, and we could have tried to do that to the fatwa I suppose, but it would 
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have been very long. It would have been a good five or ten pages if you try to address most of 
the bigger issues.”202 
Hassan designed the counter-terror fatwa to be short in nature to have it disseminated to a 
wider audience. According to Hasan, “The idea was to keep the message short and sharp and not 
some long drawn out thing.” In comparing his fatwa to the statement Letter to Al-Baghdadi 
issued in the US in 2014, which he notes as being more theologically rigorous when it came to 
the jihadi verses (and which Appendix C has shown to have only discussed 5 out of the 17 
specific Qur’anic verses that endorse violence and are used to justify Islamic terrorism), Hasan 
says, “The purpose of ours was a different one, towards for mass consumption, that’s why we 
only limited it into one page and even the Qur’anic references were supposed to be kind of 
media-friendly, kind of bite-size ones. For example, the Qur’anic reference on non-compulsion 
of religion, it’s quite well-known across the world now because of this kind of approach.”203  
Hassan argues that designing a counter-terror fatwa that challenges the specific Qur’anic 
verses that endorse violence by Islamic terrorists is a large task. He says, “Scripture is very 
difficult to deal with, we’ve had so many meetings on so much historical references. So it was 
simply not the place in terms of brevity, because if you get to grapple with some of the jihadist 
scripture arguments, you have to deal with all of it basically or the equally-related ones.” To 
address those specific Qur’anic verses he opined, “in my view, to do it properly does mean 
something like a hundred, two hundred-page book, because of the serious issues of those verses: 
what do they mean, what’s the context of those verses, what are they historically and scripturally 
based on, all the different connotations that said, how are the jihadist groups using, how justified 
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are they or how unjustified are they, how do you explain or refute the way they use those 
verses.” He argues, “All of those are the very kind of detailed issues of theology and 
jurisprudence which need a proper background in Qur’an, hadith study, and everything else. 
That’s a big project.”204  
Hasan also mentions that Quilliam is working on a project that challenges some of the 
specific Qur’anic verses that endorse violence used to justify terrorism; however, like 
Soharwardy’s similar project examined above, this is not a fatwa. Specifically, the 200-page 
book will have comprehensive responses to the jihadist theological arguments used by ISIS. In 
supporting his previous point regarding the type of task required to design a theologically-
rigorous counter-terror fatwa, Hasan compares the soon-to-be-published book and the already-
issued counter-terror fatwa to illustrate the difference in time required by the two projects: “To 
give you an idea, we’ve spent this entire year working on the project we’re about to publish. So 
that’s a complete different scale, if you like, the scale of work required to get rather than the one 
or two weeks which was involved in our fatwa.”205  
Another issuer explained that their counter-terror fatwa was intended to be short because 
people would be unable to comprehend or would not be interested in a long counter-terror fatwa. 
Upon asking Jamal Badawi, a member of the FIQH Council of North America206 who helped 
draft a fatwa against terrorism in 2005 (reissued in 2007), why the counter-terror fatwa did not 
address the specific Qur’anic verses, he refers to the constraints on informing the public: “Of 
course, there are limits when you are advising the public with limited knowledge in Islam.” In 
demonstrating this point, like Hasan, he praises the Letter to Baghdadi, which the FIQH Council 
																																																						
204 Usama Hasan, telephone interview by author, April 2017. 
205 Usama Hasan, telephone interview by author, April 2017. 




had signed (and which Appendix C has shown to have only discussed 5 out of the 17 specific 
Qur’anic verses that endorse violence and are typically used to justify Islamic terrorism), and 
while he regards the statement as “highly scholarly”, he says that comprehending its 
sophisticated arguments would be “very difficult for people who are very unaware of what Islam 
is teaching.” He lists an example to show the extent of the publics’ unfamiliarity with the 
religion: “I’ve seen some on TV asking them what is Islam, somebody said back, ‘oh yeah, this 
is a kind of sport.’” Badawi argues that the counter-terror fatwa by the FIQH Council was 
“intended for the public or otherwise we get lost in the scholarly discourse.” Fatwas, he adds, 
have “to be brief to reach everybody … If you go into details, you can write a book. But how 
much patience would people have?”207  
In fact, Badawi argues that their counter-terror fatwa’s strategy of citing verses that 
present Islam as a religion of peace to justify their position is actually a superior response to the 
Islamist terrorist narrative. Initially, he commented that the counter-terror fatwa challenges some 
of the specific Qur’anic verses that endorse violence and are typically used to justify Islamic 
terrorism208: “they say the verse say that, when we say no that doesn’t mean that, that’s one 
part.” However, he argues that the verses that present Islam as a religion of peace is ultimately 
used to justify their position since it is better than directly challenging the specific Qur’anic 
verses that endorse violence: “But the other part which is even more important than just 
correcting the source and misunderstanding is the positive side [of Islam]. What are the values? 
What does Islam teach about … the underpinning values of mercy, of justice, of the best basic 
rules quoted from the Qur’an.” According to Badawi, this reliance on verses that present Islam as 
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a religion of peace works because the verses are “clearly a response to those [Islamist terrorists] 
who say these are kuffars [nonbelievers] and these are infidels [unbelievers].”209  
In a similar vein to Hassan, Badawi notes it is a large task to create counter-terror fatwas 
that challenge specific Qur’anic verses that endorse violence used by Islamist terrorists. He 
emphasizes that sophisticated counter-terror fatwas require more preparation: “Because if you 
start dealing with the misquotations and details, then either you give the full details so that there 
be no misunderstanding it, or do harm in fact, if you give a half-cooked type of answer.”210   
Stepping away from fatwas for a moment, Badawi mentions he has authored a project 
that challenges some of the specific Qur’anic verses that endorse violence used to justify 
terrorism, but like Soharwardy and Hassan, his project was not a fatwa. Specifically, Badawi 
wrote a scholarly paper that he says directly tackles Qur’anic verses that endorse the killing of 
unbelievers. He adds, “Things that are taken out of historical and textual context, cut and paste 
approach, cherry picking, so it touched on that briefly but that’s what I elaborated in the paper 
which has been, by the way, quite, quite popular.”211 To see how this scholarly paper addressed 
the specific Qur’anic verses that endorse violence and are typically used to justify Islamic 
terrorism, see Appendix B (it only discusses 4 out of the 17 specific Qur’anic verses).  
Altogether, the three counter-terror fatwas issuers did not address the specific Qur’anic 
verses that endorse violence typically used by Islamist terrorists, chiefly because they designed 
their fatwas to be short. They avoided designing long, sophisticated counter-terror fatwas for 
several reasons. The two most cited reasons were that people would be disinclined to read it 
because of the length—one interviewee even stated that most people lacked enough basic 
																																																						
209 Jamal Badawi, telephone interview by author, May 2017. 
210 Jamal Badawi, telephone interview by author, May 2017. 




knowledge in Islam to comprehend it—and that designing one is a large endeavor. Other reasons 
for making a short, unsophisticated counter-terror fatwa were that one issuer had intended to 
physically disseminate it to a larger audience, and another issuer preferred to cite verses that 
present Islam as a religion of peace because they considered this the superior strategy for 
deterring Islamist terrorism. However, these listed reasons raise questions about the plausibility 
of their approach.      
With regard to the assumption that people are not interested in reading a long, 
sophisticated counter-terror fatwa, why is this assumption held? If the fatwa is designed with the 
public in mind, and not just Muslims, this explanation makes sense. However, this raises a 
further question: why are counter-terror fatwas designed for the public when fatwas are only 
applicable to Muslims? Fatwas do not carry authority for people of other faiths (or lack thereof). 
And if counter-terror fatwas were designed for a Muslim audience, why do the issuers neglect to 
recognize the extent of the audience’s religiosity and presume they would not be interested in 
reading a long, sophisticated counter-terror fatwa? Surely the religiosity of Muslims is not low 
enough to discount their interest in reading an authoritative ruling that thoroughly refutes 
Islamist terrorist justification because of the ruling’s length and rigour. In fact, if anything, 
studies have reported a marked increase in religiosity in individuals prior to partaking in the 
jihad.212 
With regard to the reason that creating a long, sophisticated counter-terror fatwa would 
be a big task, why is it then that the 3 issuers and/or their respective organizations have released 
or are planning on releasing lengthy statements that do directly challenge some of these specific 
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Qur’anic verses endorsing violence?213 After all, fatwas can be made long. Muhammad Khalid 
Masud, who has published extensively on Islamic law and is currently the acting Director 
General of the Islamic Research Institute in Islamabad, affirms that fatwas can be made longer 
when dealing with a contentious topic.  “No length has been specified as a requirement,” he says. 
“Argumentative fatwas are naturally longer than those where the matter is simple.”214 Granted, 
some of the issuers said that creating a sophisticated counter-terror fatwa requires extensive 
preparation, but so do their lengthy statements. One of the issuers notes that their short counter-
terror fatwa took 1-2 weeks to create; a stark contrast with their statement, which they have been 
working on for close to a year. This suggests that the counter-terror fatwa issuers prefer a lengthy 
statement over a lengthy fatwa. A possible explanation could be that the issuers may be 
dissuaded by the higher standard of quality in place for fatwas, where the stakes are higher for 
mistakes. Creating a long, sophisticated counter-terror fatwa without any mistakes can certainly 
be overwhelming for a small team of theologians (let alone one). However, the Letter to 
Baghdadi, a lengthy point-by-point refutation of ISIS ideology, which also was praised by some 
of the issuers above for its theological sophistication, will be used to challenge the plausibility of 
this explanation. If this 28-page letter was issued by over 120 Islamic scholars worldwide, “many 
of them leading Muslim voices in their own country,” then the content must have been reliable 
enough to be issued as a fatwa.  
With regard to the assertion that a counter-terror fatwa must be made deliberately short to 
physically disseminate it to a large audience, why do the creators assume that a long counter-
terror fatwa could not be disseminated just as successfully? Qadri’s Fatwa on Terrorism and 
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Suicide Bombings is the longest counter-terror fatwa (512 pages long), and yet, it is one of the 
most widely disseminated counter-terror fatwas to date and has received considerable coverage 
through major news outlets and TV news station from around the world.215 Moreover, this fatwa 
was discussed by at least 3200 web links in the very year it was issued.216 While it is intuitive to 
believe that a short counter-terror fatwa would help it be disseminated more easily, the notion 
neglects to consider important factors that are key to a fatwa’s successful dissemination, such as 
having the financial capability to fund a press release and to promote it. Indeed, Qadri’s 
organization’s backing and promotion of the press conference event for his 2010 counterterror 
fatwa were cited by the British press reports as reasons for successfully drawing “much more 
media and public attention that it would have received otherwise.”217 
With regard to the argument that counter-terror fatwas should cite verses that present 
Islam as a religion of peace because they create a superior response to deter Islamist terrorism—
how does this make sense? The thesis earlier found that the popular verses frequently cited to 
present Islam as a religion of peace had certain conditions and limitations. For example, while 
one Qur’anic verse states that there is no compulsion in religion, and this may sound promising, 
its application is limited to only some groups. If such a counter-terror fatwa relies solely on such 
verses, it is hardly convincing to non-Muslims, and it cannot sway ardent jihadists who are 
steeped in Islamist literature.  
																																																						
215 “Fatwa Against Terrorism and Suicide Bombings: Global Media Coverage,” 2010, 
http://www.minhaj.org/downloads/Fatwa_Global-Media-Coverage_English_volume-01.pdf; “Fatwa Against 
Terrorism and Suicide Bombings: Global Media Coverage. Vol. 2,” 2010, 
http://www.minhaj.org/downloads/Fatwa_Global-Media-Coverage_English_Volume-02.pdf. 
216 “Fatwa Against Terrorism and Suicide Bombings: Global Media Coverage. Vol. 2,” 76–199. 




Perhaps there are theological constraints that prevent issuers from challenging the 
Qur’anic verses that endorse violence through fatwas. Maybe counter-terror fatwas that 
challenge these specific Qur’anic verses that endorse violence can only be issued by moderate 
Muslims. An interview with Moiz Amjad, the then-editor of Understanding Islam218, about his 
2001 “academic” fatwa, which challenged the specific Qur’anic verses endorsing violence that 
were invoked by Bin Laden in his 1998 terror fatwa, helped shed some light on this matter.219 
When asked why he is among the few issuers of fatwas who actually discusses and challenges 
the specific Qur’anic verses that endorse violence typically invoked to justify Islamic terrorism, 
he replied, “really honestly it is because of my line of reasoning.” 220 He explains that it is a 
moderate “line of reasoning”, as opposed to a conservative one, that is instrumental when issuing 
counter-terror fatwas with sophisticated content:  
Basically, my line of reasoning was very different … [the] line of reasoning of Bin Laden’s 
fatwa and those who tried to counter that was no different. They had the same line of 
reasoning. My line of reasoning and my principles of understanding the religion and 
principles of interpreting the Qur’an were completely pulled apart from all others and that 
is why I think that my answers … would have been construed as being unique … my line 
of reasoning … my principles of understanding religion were quite different from almost 
all the others. If anybody issued, have issued any counter narratives or counter fatwa they 
would have only given a rhetorical response rather than a counter interpretation of the 
verses involved, but because of my own interpretation of the Qur’an is quite different form 
the others, and I obviously understand that to be the correct one, therefore I think it was 
not at all difficult for me to just write down the interpretations that I consider to be great.221    
 
But what does a moderate line of reasoning like Amjad’s entail? When asked to elaborate on his 
line of reasoning, Amjad offered some highlights:  
the first thing is … according to my principles of interpreting the Qur’an, which I have 
learned from my teacher, the Qur’an is absolute. I mean the Qur’anic interpretation has to 
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be supreme. I mean if there is a narrative, if there is a Hadith that has been quoted and it 
does not fit in our interpretation of the Qur’an we cannot accept that hadith to be correct 
because Hadith is not something that he prophet has said, Hadith is something that the 
prophet is ascribed to have said, and this description could be wrong so even if the hadith 
is correct and every person in that chain of four narratives is reliable and intelligent and 
has a good memory still we could have misunderstood something and therefore we would 
never put hadith over the Qur’anic interpretation and adjust our Qur’anic interpretation 
according to that hadith, so one of the primary differences is that for me hadith … is the 
supportive source of religious interpretation, it is not a primary source of religious 
interpretation. Number one.  
Number two: I believe that the Qur’anic interpretations must, without any exceptions, 
adhere to the context … If you look at my writing in this particular, you know, reply which 
you’re referring to, I keep on referring to the context of the verse quoted by the alleged 
fatwa of Bin Laden and I keep telling that you know the context does not support that 
interpretation.”222   
 
Basically, Amjad’s moderate line of reasoning places heavier emphasis on the Qur’an over the 
hadith, which describes the action and sayings of the Prophet, as sources of religious 
interpretation, which is different from most of the schools of Islamic thought where the Qur’an 
and the hadith are both primary sources. In fact, since the hadith is “often used as the lens 
through which to interpret the Koran”, it is considered by many Muslim jurists as “an even 
greater authority on the practice of Islam.”223 The hadith does however present some problems 
when it comes to challenging the specific Qur’anic verses that endorse violence. Since the hadith 
is “vital in understanding and contextualising” the stories and commandments in the Qur’an, it 
restricts the Qur’anic verses, such as those endorsing violence, to specific interpretations.224  
This becomes particularly problematic when the hadith supports and reinforces such verses 
endorsing violence in undeniably clearer terms. Moreover, since the hadith settles matters of 
																																																						
222 Moiz Amjad, video interview by author, April 2017.  
223 Sam Harris, The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 2005), 116, as quoted in M. Ruthven, Islam in the World, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2000), 
137. 





abrogation225,226 it has some of the verses that present Islam as a religion of peace superseded by 
the verses endorsing violence.227 In fact, according to the principle of abrogation, the “’verse of 
the sword” (Qur’an 9:5) supersedes 124 verses that present Islam as a religion of peace.228 This 
marked shift in militancy corresponds to the notion that God commanded Prophet Muhammad 
and his followers “to fight an aggressive war against polytheists and later monotheists like the 
Jews of Khaybar in Mecca” much later than the commands for non-aggression in Medina and 
beyond.229 Suffice to say, when Amjad’s moderate line of reasoning has the hadith downgraded 
from a primary source of religious interpretation to a supportive one, Amjad is able to avoid the 
obstacles outlined above and exercise more freedom in interpreting and challenging the Qur’anic 
verses as he sees fit.  
His moderate line of interpretation also allows him to contextualize Qur’anic verses 
without exception, and helps to dismiss the applicability of some the Qur’anic verses that 
endorse violence used to justify Islamic terrorism. The context that he uses “can be in the words 
of the Qur’an, in the sentences, sometimes it will be in the paragraphs, and sometimes it will be 
in the environment.”230 Amjad’s following example illustrates how his environmental 
contextualization works: when it comes to the verse of the sword (Qur’an 9:5), he contextualizes 
that verse to its respective “environment”, which at the time was an organized Islamic state in 
Medina under the leadership of the Prophet waging war against the pagans. He does this in 
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response to the interpretation that the verse is “directing all individual Muslims to declare war 
against all pagans of the world.”231 Amjad’s unconditional contextualization of all Qur’anic 
verses is at odds with the mainstream view that the Qur’an and, by extension, its verses are 
timeless.232 
Altogether, Moiz Amjad’s explanation provides clues about the lack of sophistication in 
most counter-terror fatwas’ content. Perhaps a moderate line of reasoning is required to issue a 
counter-terror fatwa that challenges the specific Qur’anic verses that endorse violence and are 
typically used to justify Islamic terrorism, as opposed to issuing counter-terror fatwas that merely 
cite Qur’anic verses that present Islam as a religion of peace.  
Why Do Some Counter-Terror Fatwas Receive Media Coverage and Not 
Others?  
 What accounts for the polarizing levels of online media coverage surrounding the 
counter-terror fatwas? This discrepancy may partly hinge on the fatwa issuer’s wealth, which can 
certainly be instrumental in drawing more media coverage. According to British press reports, 
this was certainly the case for Qadri’s fatwa: “The foundation’s backing and promotion of 
Tuesday’s event drew much more media and public attention than it would have received 
otherwise.”233 However, this point does not quite adequately explain the discrepancy in media 
coverage between counter-terror fatwas that are sophisticated and counter-terror fatwas that are 
not sophisticated, in which the former group has received absolutely no media coverage, while 
most of the latter have experienced some. To delve deeper, I rely on interview data, which 
happen to offer clues on the matter. I will first go over the responses by the 3 individuals who 
																																																						
231 Moiz Amjad, video interview by author, April 2017. 
232 Mona Siddiqui, How to Read the Qur’an (New York: WW Norton & Co, 2008). 




have issued unsophisticated counter-terror fatwa – Syed Soharwardy, Usama Hasan, and Jamal 
Badawi -- then examine the response of the issuer behind the sophisticated counter-terror fatwa – 
Moiz Amjad. 
 Syed Soharwardy and his organization, the Islamic Supreme Council of Canada, have 
received a lot of media coverage for their counter-terror fatwas. Soharwardy elaborates on the 
availability and extent of this media coverage:  
We disseminated it to the public through the media that we have available to us. It was 
many. All three fatwas, by the way, were covered by the Canadian media quite well and in 
fact the international media also covered all these fatwas. The United States and the 
European newspapers, Russian television. I have done interviews to the international media 
in the Middle East [and] was covered in Muslim countries in Malaysia, Indonesia, those 
people covered these fatwas so through internet, through media, and through emails. We 
did reach out to the broader humanity around the world.234 
 
It can be seen that media from around the world were available to Soharwardy in publicizing 
these fatwas. Suffice to say, Soharwardy was quite pleased with the coverage he received. In 
fact, when asked what kind of support he received for his counter-terror fatwas, he first listed  
the media as being the primary support: “I mean the best support I got is from the media [and] 
the media was coming, they covered it very well, and that’s what we wanted because we wanted 
to reach out to as many people as we could, so without the media support we could not have 
done that.”235 All in all, the media was certainly instrumental in proactively engaging and 
ultimately disseminating Soharwardy’s fatwa internationally.  
The counter-terror fatwa issued by Quilliam’s head theologian, Usama Hasan, also 
received good media coverage. According to Hasan, mainstream media played a large role in its 
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dissemination. After all, his fatwa was presented on the front page of the Sunday Times, which, 
as he explains in the following, is advantageous in receiving even more coverage:  
 The front page is published on the Saturday night, so you have major mainstream media, 
for example the BBC and SKY that do a review of the papers on a Saturday night -- every 
night, but on Saturday night of course they review the Sunday morning papers. That’s a 
good fifteen, half an hour to one hour in the other case, because Sky news did two half an 
hour programs on the Saturday night. There is plenty of exposure there. Then of course, 
throughout Sunday the major radio, TV discussion programs pick up on leading Sunday 
headlines and then do that for the rest of the week also. The kind of news cycle from 
Monday morning onward in Britain anyway is largely driven by the newspapers.236  
 
Initial media coverage can bring the necessary level of awareness needed to spur even more 
coverage by other outlets. Like Soharwardy, Hasan was also pleased with the media coverage. 
When Hasan was asked about Quilliam’s experience with the media, he said: “We were very 
pleased. I think we were lucky to get quite high levels of media publicity, largely because of the 
Sunday Times, that front page … Even on the front page you have five or six stories, and this 
was the centerpiece front-page story … we’re very, very pleased with that.” In fact, he cites the 
mainstream media as one of the primary examples of a positive response: “If you are familiar 
with the Sunday Times, for something to be on the front page, it needs the highest level of 
editorial support at the newspaper itself, who can of course have hundreds of the stories to look 
at.” He added, towards the end of the interview, that if he had anything to change it would be to 
host a media conference: “The big thing I would have done differently was … do something like 
a press release … a physical launch of the actual text rather than simply the electronic media-
based launch.” At the time, Quilliam “didn’t have the time or the resources in terms of money to 
do something like a press conference.”237 
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The FIQH Council of North America fatwa wanted even greater media coverage for their 
counter-terror fatwa. According to Jamal Badawi, “it wasn’t really as big as we had expected.”238 
He clarifies: “I’m not saying that it’s not covered at all, but it is not really proportionate to what 
happened.”239 However, I did find extensive media coverage for this counter-terror fatwa, with 
mainstream media outlets from the US to China reporting on the fatwa. Moreover, the FIQH 
Council of North America had issued this counter-terror fatwa at a press conference in 
Washington.240 Regardless, Badawi and the FIQH Council were not pleased with the level of 
media coverage for their counter-terror fatwa.  
To sum up, all three of the issuers did receive media coverage for their fatwas, which is 
corroborated by the findings of this study. Soharwardy from the Islamic Supreme Council of 
Canada and Hasan from Quilliam were quite pleased with the media coverage. According to 
Badawi, the FIQH Council of North America wanted more media exposure, though this research 
paper did find extensive media coverage reporting on the organizations’ fatwa. 
Moiz Amjad, the then-founder of Understanding Islam and the issuer of a sophisticated 
counter-terror fatwa, confirmed during his interview that his counter-terror fatwa received no 
media coverage, which corresponds with the findings of this study. His explanation for this lack 
of coverage, however, offers clues about why counter-terror fatwas that challenge the specific 
Qur’anic verses endorsing violence typically used to justify terrorism by Islamist terrorists rarely 
seem to receive any media coverage. What Amjad had encountered was a physical limitation that 
prevented his counter-terror fatwa from being fully covered by the media: “Yeah in fact this 
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opinion that I have written over there [Understanding Islam] it was, actually it has been given on 
the media by a few of my colleagues, senior colleague, my teacher, and they had to go into an 
exile, self-imposed exile, because of that.” Essentially, Amjad’s counter-terror fatwa was met 
with such a hostile and threatening reaction by the public in Pakistan that those involved with the 
fatwa’s short-lived publicity were forced to go into exile. If Amjad’s experience serves as any 
indicator, it would seem that there are some very real obstacles preventing those with a moderate 




































Chapter 4: Why Counter-Terror Fatwas Can Be Effective  
To understand why counter-terror fatwas could be an effective response to terrorism and 
Islamist terrorist organisations, it is important to first understand what fatwas are and their 
function in Islam. Associating religious edicts with fatwas, while accurate, does not adequately 
capture the nuances of the concept. It is important to consider the influence that religious ideas 
can have over people. For pious Muslims preoccupied with attaining paradise, fatwas can be 
immensely influential in guiding them on their path. It is here that counter-terror fatwas can play 
an integral role in deterring Islamist terrorism. In this chapter, I begin with a review of fatwas 
and their role in Islam, I then examine and expand on the influence of religious ideas, and finally, 
examine how counter-terror fatwas can be made more effective.  
Fatwas and their Role in Islam 
What is a fatwa? What role do fatwas play in Islam? To answer the first question is 
simple: a fatwa is a “formal, legal opinion based on a mufti’s (legal scholar’s) interpretation of 
the law.”242 To answer the second question, however, certain religious particularities must be 
understood in order to learn and ultimately appreciate the role of fatwas.  
Islam is not merely a monotheistic religion; it is a political system.243 Since the time of 
the Prophet, Islam has been “associated in the minds and memories of Muslims with the exercise 
of political and military power.”244 This assumption that religion and politics are inseparable is 
rooted in all of classical Islamic literature.245 Throughout history there have been several 
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instances of legal systems being attached to religion, but the Islamic legal system is arguably 
unique in the comprehensiveness of the laws determined to be commanded personally by God. 
Islam provides government by sacrosanct law with a sophisticated legal code that directs 
human behavior.246 The Islamic legal code, also known as Shar’iah in Arabic, is the “Whole 
Duty of Man”, and it regulates all aspects of human behaviors, such as:  
Moral and pastoral theology and ethics; high spiritual aspiration and the detailed ritualistic 
and formal observance which to some minds is a vehicle for such aspiration and to others 
a substitute for it; all aspects of law; public and private hygiene; and even courtesy and 
good manners.247  
 
Not only are Muslims required to demonstrate correct belief, but they are required to display 
correct practice that strictly adheres to the Islamic legal code.248 The ultimate purpose of Islamic 
law is for the Muslim to be accepted into paradise in the hereafter.249 
The term Shar’iah was originally defined in Arabic as the path used to bring camels to 
watering grounds, but it was later adapted in Islam to mean the sacred path for Muslims to 
achieve salvation.250 This “straight path” is dictated by the sources of Shar’iah, and both the 
Qur’an and the hadiths (which recounts the action and sayings of the Prophet).251 These two 
sources of Shar’iah are used through casuistic analysis to work out religious issues and provide 
prescription of actions with reference to right and wrong.252 The five moral categories of actions 
are classified as obligatory (wajib), recommended (mandub), permissible (mubah), disapproved 
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(makruh), or forbidden (haram).253 Generally speaking, those who perform obligatory actions are 
rewarded in the hereafter, and those who do not, face punishment; conversely, those who 
perform forbidden actions will receive punishment in the hereafter, and those who do not, are 
rewarded. Most actions are permissible, and performing them has no bearing in the hereafter. 
Who determines which actions are obligatory and which actions are forbidden and 
ultimately disseminates them to the public? It is not the laity, for they have neither the time, the 
training, nor arguably the capacity, to investigate Islamic law.254  Rather, the jurists determine 
the five moral categories of actions.255 Thus, the laity is responsible to imitate the jurists, which 
is known as performing taqlid. 256 Muftis are qualified jurists.257 In the following, Bar neatly 
explains how the Muftis’ determinations are conveyed to the Muslim community: 
The mechanism by which the scholar brings the principles of shari’ah to bear in the 
practical world is fiqh—Islamic jurisprudence, and its product is the fatwa—a written legal 
opinion or ruling on a specific subject, which dispels uncertainty and shows the clear path 
for behavior on the chosen subject. A fatwa can only be given by a scholar with wide 
enough knowledge of shar’ia to be considered a mufti. The classic fatwa consists of a 
question (istifta’), posed by a petitioner (mustafti pl. mustatifun), and a response (jawab). 
A fatwa must be based on the sources (usul) or fiqh: these includes the Qur’an, the Sunna, 
logical analogy (qiyas) and consensus of the “uluma.” However, most fatwas make little 
use of these tools and instead very often cite precedents from decisions by the mujtahidun 
of early Islam and the codex of existing fatwas.258  
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The role Muftis play here is very important. It is not without reason that a mufti is seen as “the 
heir of the prophets”, “the signatory for God Almighty” and one who stands “between God 
Almighty and His creatures.”259 
Throughout the history of Islam, millions of fatwas have been issued, mostly to address 
issues encountered by followers, such as marriage customs, financial proceedings, and moral 
inquiries.260 Generally, they are given in response to questions posed by followers or courts.261 
According to the adabl al mufti treatises, the classical guidelines for fatwas, for the followers 
fatwas are typically concise, informal; for the courts “a fuller technical discussion” is generally 
required.262 However, while fatwas can be as short as one-word answers, the emphasis is for 
them to be clear and correct.263 When it comes to a complicated matter, “argumentative fatwas 
are naturally longer than those where the matter is simple.”264  
Generally, fatwas are non-binding for the largest sect of Islam. Sunni Muslims do not 
have to accept the scholar’s ruling. In fact, they may seek another opinion. But even then, as Bar 
makes clear, often a follower can anticipate in advance how the fatwa will turn out “because he 
is strongly affiliated with a certain scholar and shares his general religious worldview.”265  
 However, fatwas become binding for fundamentalist or radical movements. They become 
binding because the members from these movements, typically lay Muslims, are subordinated to 
the mufti’s authority. The members’ acceptance of the authority of leaders in these movements is 
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reflected by the prestigious titles ascribed to such leaders, such as Commander (Amir), Overseer 
(Moraqib), Guide (Murshid) and Messiah (Mahdi). These members often commit pledges of 
allegiance to these leaders, effectively signifying they accept the leader as their spiritual guide. It 
is in this context that fatwas can act as “operational diktats.”266  
 As for the Shiite Muslims, fatwas can be binding. Shiites must follow the highest 
authority, the marja al-Taqlid,267 which in English is translated as ‘model of emulation’. A Shiite 
Muslim should follow only one Majra, even though there are a number of them from different 
Muslim countries in the Shiite population. When one Majra passes away, the follower must 
follow another.268   
The Influence of Religious Ideas  
Although fatwas are binding for certain segments of the Muslim population, but less so 
for others, fatwas are influential for all Muslims, if they are concerned with attaining paradise in 
the hereafter. Devote Muslims view fatwas as guiding them on the straight path to heaven. 
Muslims that perform obligatory actions are rewarded in the hereafter, those who perform 
forbidden actions receive punishment. Shaykh Shafiq Hudda from the Islamic Humanitarian 
Service states that a fatwa is “some guideline that one needs to follow or act upon […] and 
primarily it refers to acts of worship, acts of one’s obedience to God, to Almighty Allah.”269 
When asked about the extent of influence that fatwas have over Muslims, he responded, “fatwas 
definitely do have a significant influence on the life of a Muslim whether it’s a Shia or Sunni … 
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It would have an influence or significant influence on all Muslims’ lives because it is what 
guides us.”270  
To truly appreciate the effect that fatwas, and, by extension, counter-terror fatwas may 
have, we must understand the influence that religious ideas can have in general. Chris Parson’s 
work on ideational explanations, a type of explanation of human action, is helpful in that regard. 
According to Parsons, “‘ideational elements’ cause certain actions in ideational claims.”271 What 
are ideational elements? Ideational elements overlap with most of the definitions of the related 
term ‘culture’, such as “practices, symbols, norms, grammars, models, beliefs, ideas, and/or 
identities that carry meanings about the world.”272 Parsons says there is a short, direct connection 
between ideational elements and the core logic of ideational explanations: “When we say that 
people hold certain cultures or beliefs, we are not just making a descriptive statement that leaves 
open the causal dynamics. It makes little sense to call something a ‘belief’ unless we also mean 
that someone believes in it: that they use it to assign meaning and interpret the world around 
them.”273 Thus, he maintains, the very concept of ideas, culture or beliefs is directly linked to the 
core logic of ideational explanation: “It explains actions as a result of people interpreting their 
world through certain ideational elements.”274   
 There are different ideational explanations, and, by extension, different ideational schools 
of thought.275 The ideational schools of thought differ from one another based on the questions 
asked, methods used, and levels of analysis applied. However, their key difference has to do with 
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the relationships between ideational elements and action, and these vary on a number of 
dimensions. The Ends versus Means dimension, specifically the ‘Ends’-focused arguments, is 
most pertinent to the scope of this thesis’ examination of counter-terror fatwas. Parsons 
elaborates on what the ends-focused arguments entail:  
Ideational elements might cause action by defining end goals, indirectly leading people to 
choose certain actions, or by defining courses of action directly as conceivable or 
appropriate. ‘Ends’-focused arguments suggest a somewhat higher degree of awareness of 
the objective world. They imply that once people have their goals, they choose the means 
to pursue them in a fairly unconstrained, instrumental fashion. The most famous example 
is Weber’s argument in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, in which certain 
beliefs about salvation made it rational for Protestants to become intensely capitalistic in 
this life.276 Once religious beliefs defined their end goal, Protestants figured out concrete 
ways to get there.277 
 
The ‘ends’-focused argument is quite relevant to Muslim belief about paradise and following of 
the path of Shar’iah, guided by fatwas, to get there. 
 As discussed, shar’iah, also known as the Islamic legal code, is critically important for 
pious Muslims. Its ultimate purpose is to help Muslims to achieve paradise. 278 As Khadduri 
argues, “The practical importance of the sacred law for the pious Muslim is much greater than 
that of any secular legal system for the ordinary law-abiding citizen. Islamic law […] tells him 
what his religious duties are, what makes him ritually clean or unclean, what he may eat or drink, 
how to dress and how to treat his family, and generally what he may with good conscience 
regard in the widest sense as lawful acts and possessions.”279 It is Islamic law that identifies 
actions with reference to right and wrong, 280 and it is the responsibility of the jurist to determine 
the five moral categories of actions—obligatory (wajib), recommended (mandub), permissible 
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(mubab), disapproved (makrub), or forbidden (haram). 281 Obligatory actions are followed with a 
reward in the hereafter, and forbidden actions are followed with eternal punishment. Islamic 
jurisprudence and its product, fatwas, is the mechanism through which principles of Shar’iah are 
brought to the attention of Muslims. 282 Thus, fatwas help clear the path to salvation, where for 
Muslim puritans “the straight path (al-sirat al-mustawim) is  fixed […] by a system of divine 
laws (shari’a) that trump any moral considerations or ethical values that are not fully codified in 
the law.”283 The ideational element in this is the Islamic belief in salvation, which causes pious 
Muslims to adhere to fatwas and ultimately Islamic law. 
  When it comes to Islamist terrorism, the influence that fatwas and Islamic law have on 
pious Muslims must not be neglected. Studies have shown a marked increase in religiosity in 
individuals prior to partaking in the jihad. Sageman affirms that “there was a definite shift in 
degree of devotion to Islam in adulthood by the mujahedin, preceding their recruitment into the 
jihad.”284 Bakker’s study also corroborated Sageman’s findings: “before joining the jihad and 
getting involved in terrorist activities most people become more religious.”285 In fact, according 
to the New America Foundation report, from 9/11 through to the end of 2016, the majority of 
jihadists behind terrorist plots and attacks in the US were all converts. 286 With increased 
religiosity comes a more fervent subscription to religious ideas. Dawson and Amarsingam’s 
study of foreign fighters, involving interviews with 20 jihadists in Syria, found that the ultimate 
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purpose for most was to attain paradise, and to achieve this end they believed they were required 
to commit their lives to jihad and martyrdom.287 For this pool of Islamist terrorists who wages 
jihad to secure paradise in the hereafter, terror fatwas can certainly be influential. It is through 
terror fatwas that radical scholars establish jihad as an obligatory action of the Muslim 
community, and Muslims and converts who have experienced a sharp increase in religiosity prior 
to becoming Islamist terrorists, can be compelled to carry out such actions to attain paradise in 
the hereafter.  
 Several examples clearly demonstrate the terror fatwas’ crucial role in inciting violence 
and terrorist attacks. One prominent example is an interview with Muhammad Abd Al-Hadi 
Muhammad, a Libyan terrorist arrested in Iraq, that was aired on Al-Fayhaa TV (Iraq) on 
January 24, 2005. Muhammad explains in the dialogue with the interviewer that a terror fatwa 
incited him and other group members to “fight for the Iraqis”:  
Interviewer: Muhammad, do you pray?  
 
Muhammad Abd Al-Hadi Muhammad: Yes, I pray.  
 
Interviewer: If you pray, you are supposed to act according to religious law. According to 
religious law, you should have gone to a sheik or a religious authority and asked him.   
 
Muhammad Abd Al-Hadi Muhammad: I did ask.   
 
Interviewer: Who did you ask?   
 
Muhammad Abd Al-Hadi Muhammad: I asked a sheik in Libya.  
 
Interviewer: Who?   
 
Muhammad Abd Al-Hadi Muhammad: A sheik in Banghazi.  
 
Interviewer: What is this sheik's name?   
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Muhammad Abd Al-Hadi Muhammad: It's a group, not only one.   
 
Interviewer: A group of sheiks?   
 
Muhammad Abd Al-Hadi Muhammad: Yes. I asked a few sheiks.   
 
Interviewer: What are their names? What mosques are they from?  
 
Muhammad Abd Al-Hadi Muhammad: Mosques in Banghazi.  
 
Interviewer: But there are lots of mosques in Banghazi.   
 
Muhammad Abd Al-Hadi Muhammad: They all issued a fatwa, not just one sheik.  
 
Interviewer: What does the fatwa say?   
 
Muhammad Abd Al-Hadi Muhammad: The fatwa deals with Jihad in Iraq.   
 
Interviewer: You personally heard from the sheiks in the mosques of Banghazi, who said 
that…   
 
Muhammad Abd Al-Hadi Muhammad: No, in sermons.  
 
Interviewer: through the sermons, they issued a fatwa that one should go on Jihad in Iraq?   
 
Muhammad Abd Al-Hadi Muhammad: Yes.   
 
Interviewer: And on the basis of the Banghazi sheiks' fatwa, you decided to go on Jihad in 
Iraq?   
 
Muhammad Abd Al-Hadi Muhammad: Yes.  
 
We did not come to kill innocent Iraqis.288 
 
It is easy to see that the terror fatwa issued by some sheiks in Libya had incited Muhammad to 
wage jihad in Iraq.  
 Another salient example involves the interrogation of Talal Ra’ad Sleiman Yasin, an 
Iraqi terrorist, which aired on March 9, 2005 on Al-Iraqiya TV, a news channel in Iraq. This 
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example focuses on a Saudi-sanctioned fatwa permitting the slaughter of policemen and National 
Guard personnel, effectively showing the very real consequences terror fatwas can cause:  
Interviewer: During our conversation you talked about policemen and National Guard 
personnel being slaughtered. Can you tell us about this, and about the basis of such fatwas 
in Islamic law?   
 
Yasin: Actually, Islamic law is not my field. But after the People of the Hadith Association 
was established in Mosul...   
 
Interviewer: When?   
 
Yasin: This association was established after the fall of the regime and was headed by 
Nidham Al-Din Haddad, who was a cleric.   
 
Interviewer: Was he an Iraqi?   
 
Yasin: Yes, from Mosul. These clerics discussed the Koran and the Sunna and Islamic legal 
argumentation. After this association was established they issued a ruling that prohibited 
killing policemen and National Guard personnel. Later, Nidham went on a pilgrimage to 
Mecca - as Allah is my witness - and when he returned from his pilgrimage, one of his 
students asked him about killing policemen, and he permitted this.  
 
Interviewer: Who was Nidham working for, and who financed him?   
 
Yasin: The association preaches the Salafi approach - but moderate Salafism, and not the 
Salafism that accuses others of heresy. But when he went to Saudi Arabia, he met with 
clerics or with the Council of Senior 'Ulama in Saudi Arabia.   
 
Interviewer: Who did he meet in Saudi Arabia?   
 
Yasin: I think...… According to what was said, he met with the Mufti of Saudi Arabia, 
Saleh... Excuse me, 'Abd Al-'Aziz Aal Al-Sheik and with Sheik Saleh Al-Fawzan.  
 
Interviewer: Then the fatwa came from Saudi Arabia?   
 
Yasin: Yes, he said this when he came back.   
 
Interviewer: What fatwas were issued when he came returned from his pilgrimage?  
 
Yasin: The fatwa concerning attacks on the Americans and their supporters. When he was 





Interviewer: When an operation is carried out in Saudi Arabia they call it "a terrorist attack" 
but when a terrorist attack takes place in Iraq they call it "Jihad." Hasn't this occurred to 
you?   
 
Yasin: I don't believe what they say about the Jihad in Iraq, but Satan tempted me. I 
generally follow the path of moderation and not of accusations of heresy. In this case I was 
wrong.289 
 
Later in the conversation Yasin admitted that he carried out the operations because of this fatwa.  
 Another example was examined during an interview with ‘Abd Al-Rahim bin 
Muhammad bin ‘Abdallah Al Muteiri, a Saudi Terrorist captured in Iraq that aired on March 31, 
2005 on Al-Iraqiya TV. In the interview, Muteiri explains he waged jihad in Iraq because of two 
separate terror fatwas:  
Muteri: I hadn’t thought of coming to Iraq, but I had fatwas (calling for Jihad).  
 
Interview: Fatwas from senior clerics or minor ones?  
 
Muteri: I read the communiqué of the 26 clerics [287], and (I heard) some lectures and 
sermons from “For you, Baghdad,” as well as Sheik Al-‘Anzi and other doctors who appear 
on TV, like Dr. Yousuf Al-Qaradhawi, who issued (a fatwa) ruling that any American in 
Iraq must be killed.290  
 
We can clearly see that the two terror fatwas had incited Muteri to wage jihad in Iraq.    
 There are other examples of terror fatwas playing crucial roles in inciting terrorist actions 
and attempts. Majed Shabib Al-Uteibi accused the 26 signatories of the communiqué,291 also 
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known as a terror fatwa, of causing the death of his son who left to wage jihad in Iraq based on 
the fatwa’s instructions.292 Another more recent example can be found in the trial of a terrorist 
cell, accused by the Saudi government of being involved in the Riydah Compound Bombings. Of 
the 85 members held for trial, six defendants were accused of being members of Al Qaeda and 
traveling to Afghanistan. These six all stated that the fatwas issued by the Saudi clerics incited 
them to travel to Afghanistan.293  
Rushdie was able to survive Grand Ayatollah Khomeinei’s death fatwa, but the same 
cannot be said for the Egyptian secularist Farag Foda, whose murder in 1992 was attributed to an 
Egyptian fatwa condemning secularist writers as enemies of Islam, which was adopted by some 
of the establishment scholars from Al-Azhar.294 The terrorists on trial claimed this fatwa by Al-
Azhar prompted them to carry out the murder of Foda.    
 There was even a manifesto published in 2004, named “Fatwas are a Primary Cause of 
Terrorism,” written by Arab liberals – a Al-Nabulsi, Jordanian writer and researcher, Lafif 
Lakhdar, a Tunisian intellectual, and Dr. Jawad Hashem, the previous Iraqi Minister of 
Planning.295 It was published through liberal Arab websites, and petitioned the United Nations to 
create an international tribunal that would prosecute any individual or group involved with 
terrorist activities, directly or indirectly, including issuing fatwas that incite Muslims to carry out 
terrorist acts. The authors of this manifesto clearly explain the causal role of fatwas in terrorism:  
By these fatwas all terrorists have died, or will die, fully convinced that they will 
immediately enter Paradise. Of course, we are not excluding other causes for committing 
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terrorist acts, such as the ticking-bomb of population explosion with its resultant illiteracy, 
poverty, unemployment, backwardness in education systems, reactionary religious 
teaching, and above all, living under dictatorial systems of governments in almost all Arab 
countries. But despite the above causes, certain religious fatwas remain the pivotal cause 
of terrorist acts – fatwas which clothe such terrorist acts with legitimacy as being one of 
the sacred tenets of Muslim faith.296    
 
It is clear that terror fatwas play a role in causing terrorist actions. But what effect can 
counter-terror fatwas have when trying to achieve the reverse? As examined earlier in the 
Counter-Terror Fatwa Study Data section, Ayatollah Sistani’s counter-terror fatwa in 2006 may 
well be the reason that no distinctly Shia-related terrorist incidents have occurred in Canada and 
the United States. However, there is a chance that the lack of Shia terrorist attacks in the US and 
Canada merely coincides with the fatwa. Fortunately, there is a better example, and while this 
example is not exactly a counter-terror fatwa, it is quite close and was also issued by Ayatollah 
Sistani.  
Ayatollah Sistani issued a fatwa in 2014 that called for Iraqis to defend their country. 
This was issued in response to ISIS’s territorial gains in Iraq, steadily encroaching on 
Baghdad.297 This fatwa was recorded to have caused a sizable reaction from the young males in 
the Shia communities: “Across Iraq, young men from Shia communities have, in response to 
Sistani’s fatwa, begun to mobilize.”298 The fatwa was even successful in causing Shiite 
volunteers to confront ISIS: “Heeding the call to arms by Ayatollah Sistani, Shiite volunteers 
rushed to the front lines, reinforcing defenses of the holy city of Samarra 70 miles north of 
Baghdad, and helping thwart attacks by Sunni fighters of the radical Islamic State of Iraq and 
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Syria in some small cities to the east.”299 In fact, this fatwa was so successful that it caused an 
enormous response from the Shia Muslims beyond the Iraqi border. Amir Taki of Ahl-ul-Bayt, a 
Shia TV channel in London, commented: “Within an hour [of Sistani’s broadcast] I got a phone 
call to say that people were already booking flights to Iraq. People were calling the station to ask 
if they should go to fight.”300 The huge reaction in Britain alone prompted a clarification by an 
English-speaking official that Sistani’s fatwa was intended for Iraqi citizens who were currently 
residing in Iraq and that this was not a call for jihad against ISIS. 301 One year after Sistani issued 
his fatwa, the Middle East analyst for NewsBeat Social, Ali Al-Mshakheel, shared the thoughts 
of some Iraqi journalists on the effects of the fatwa. The journalists all attested to the fatwa’s 
significant impact on the country. One journalist cited it as preventing the possible collapse of 
the country, stopping the fall of Baghdad to ISIS, and mobilizing the masses in record time. 
Another journalist cited it as the key element in mobilizing the masses against ISIS and securing 
the balance needed to win the battle against ISIS. One even cited the fatwa for providing the 
confidence needed by Iraqis to fight against ISIS.302 Even the Iraqi premier thanked Ayatollah 
Sistani for this fatwa, saying that it helped “save Iraq and paved the way for victory” over 
ISIS.303  
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Making Counter-Terror Fatwas More Effective  
 Can counter-terror fatwas be effective against terrorism and terrorist organizations? 
According to a 2010 study from the Sanford School of Public Policy at Duke University, titled, 
“Anti-Terror Lessons of Muslim-Americans,” such denunciations play a key role in deterring 
terrorism: “We have found that an important anti-radicalization activity of Muslim-American 
communities since 9/11 has been the active denunciation of terrorist violence.”304 
 Although minimal levels of academic research exist on the topic of fatwas in counter-
terrorism, a brief surge of popular interest in the topic surfaced around the time of Qadri’s 2010 
counter-terror fatwa. This popular commentary offers broad yet salient points pertaining to the 
question of whether counter-terror fatwas are effective. Douglas Murray, the Director of the 
Center for Social Cohesion, identifies how counter-terror fatwas can produce important long-
term effects against terrorism:  
A single fatwa will not change the level of denial and lack of self-criticism inherent in so 
much of modern Islam. Nor will it stop every fevered young radical eager to kill and maim. 
But the trickle-down effect is important. The most violent interpretations of Islam have 
been trickled down to terrorists via learned scholars. The clean-up operation will have to 
be dealt with by the same means.305  
 
Ed Husain, Quilliam’s Co-Founder and Co-Director, describes three things that a prominent 
counter-terror fatwa citing scripture can do:  
First, it emboldens other Muslim thought leaders to amplify their voices against extremism. 
Secondly, it prevents activist Muslims from considering suicide bombers as “martyrs”, and 
thus removes the hero status currently attached to murderers. And finally, a fatwa 
challenging perceived “martyrdom operations” will inject doubt into the minds of potential 
suicide bombers. Where there is doubt, in Islamic religious behavior, there is avoidance. 
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Suicide bombers currently kill because they have certainty (yaqeen) of being rewarded in 
the next life (akhirah).306  
 
Murray and Hussein made their comments in light of Qadri’s counter-terror fatwa, issued 
in 2010. However, seven years later, Islamist terrorism still remains, and suicide bombings 
continue unabated. There are a few issues at play that may have prevented Qadri’s counter-terror 
fatwa from becoming fully realized. One possible issue lies with the issuer’s status in the 
community; an example of this is expressed by a British Muslim convert who argues that Qadri, 
a Sufi, “is not by any means a universally accepted figure in the Muslim community, either here 
[Britain] or in Pakistan.”307 His lack of status can compromise the reach and impact of the 
counter-terror fatwa. Additionally, beyond the issuer’s status within the community, the authority 
of a fatwa also rests on the education of the issuer,308 which in Qadri’s case presents another 
issue. Instead of studying at one of the prominent schools of Islamic thought (madhab), Qadri 
studied at the University of Punjab, where he received his M.A. in Islamic Studies, and his Ph.D 
in Islamic law.309 Qadri’s lack of education credentials from an established school of Islamic 
thought can also compromise the reach and impact of his counter-terror fatwa. The fatwa’s 
authority is also based, however, on the third and final factor: the persuasiveness of the fatwa. As 
this study has shown, Qadri’s counter-terror fatwa lacked persuasiveness. Moreover, this study 
has found that the vast majority of the examined counter-terror fatwas lacked persuasiveness as 
well. The problem of persuasiveness in counter-terror fatwas is nothing new. Regarding 
Quilliam’s counter-terror fatwa, issued against ISIS in 2010, Sam Harris questioned Majid 
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Nawaaz, the Founding Chariman of Quilliam, on its lack of persuasiveness: “what struck me 
about it was how tenuous its basis in Islamic doctrine seems. It comes down to honoring 
covenants and treaties – a duty that I can’t imagine any serious Muslim believes will trump the 
obligation to defend the faith.”310 Tufail Ahmad, an ex-BBC journalist and the Executive 
Director of the Open Source Institute, also made a similar observation: “Islamic scholars must 
realize that issuing fatwas against terrorism will be inconsequential unless key areas in the Sharia 
which allow the jihadis to thrive are attacked.”311   
This study has focused on the fatwa’s persuasiveness, which in addition to the issuers’ 
education and status in community, contributes to its authority. Considering that a fatwa’s 
authority is based partially on the persuasiveness of its content, the study reasons that a counter-
terror fatwa with sophisticated content would be more persuasive, and by extension, hold more 
authority than a counter-terror fatwa without sophisticated content. Moreover, the study reasons 
that a counter-terror fatwa that discusses or challenges specific Qur’anic verses that endorse 
violence are more sophisticated than a counter-terror fatwa that cites verses that present Islam as 
a religion of peace (and hold conditions and limitations). This case gains strength when these 
verses have conditions and limitations, and are neither unequivocal nor absolute pronouncements 
of peace. By citing Qur’anic verses that only present Islam as a religion of peace, the counter-
terror fatwa is unable to challenge directly, and ultimately disrupt, the ideological core of 
Islamist terrorism. Instead, by challenging the Qur’anic verses endorsing violence that is used to 
justify Islamist terrorism, the counter-terror fatwa can best create doubt in the minds of potential 
																																																						
310 Sam Harris and Maajid Nawaz, Islam and the Future of Tolerance (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015), 
105–6. 





Islamist terrorists inspired by such verses. According to Ed Husain, Quilliam’s Co-Founder and 
Co-Director, “where there is doubt, in Islamic religious behavior, there is avoidance,” and since 
Islamist terrorists “currently kill because they have certainty (yaqeen) of being rewarded in the 
next life (akhirah),” counter-terror fatwas citing Islamic texts can remove this certainty through 
doubt and ultimately prevent attacks from happening.312 Unfortunately, this study found that the 
vast majority of the counter-terror fatwa did not challenge the specific Qur’anic verses that 
endorse violence. 
This is not to say fatwas must remain ineffective. Counter-terror fatwas can be made 
more effective in deterring Islamist terrorism by improving this factor of persuasiveness, namely 
making the content of the counter-terror fatwa more sophisticated and challenging the specific 
Quranic verses that endorse violence. When fatwas help guide pious Muslims on the straight 
path towards heaven by delineating the obligatory (wajib) and forbidden (haram) actions in 
modern times, counter-terror fatwas play an important role in deterring Islamist terrorism and 
serve as an excellent addition to other types of counter-narrative initiatives. 
  
																																																						




Chapter 5: Conclusion 
There are instances in history where terror fatwas were carried out as intended. One 
prominent example was Khomeini’s terror fatwa against Salman Rushdie that resulted in Muslim 
violence on a world scale, where those affiliated with the book, such as translators, were harmed 
or killed, and publishers and stores carrying the book were firebombed. Another famous terror 
fatwa was issued by Osama Bin Laden, and effectively expanded the scope of terrorist attacks 
from the Middle East to the West. Of course, there are many more examples as well. While terror 
fatwas have been effective in inciting terrorist actions, counter-terror fatwas that seek to do the 
reverse lag behind in terms of efficacy. This research partially examined some of the reasons 
why counter-terror fatwas are not effective in responding to terrorism and terrorist organisations. 
The study argues that counter-terror fatwas are not as effective because the contents of the fatwa 
documents lacked sophistication. The authority of fatwas is derived partly from the 
persuasiveness of the content, and based on this fact, the thesis reasons that counter-terror fatwas 
that challenge the specific Qur’anic verses that endorse violence and are typically invoked to 
justify Islamic terrorism would be more persuasive than those that do not. By challenging these 
verses, the counter-terror fatwa can best create doubt in the minds of potential Islamist terrorists 
inspired by such verses. According to Ed Husain, Quilliam’s Co-Founder and Co-Director, 
“where there is doubt, in Islamic religious behavior, there is avoidance,” and since Islamist 
terrorists “currently kill because they have certainty (yaqeen) of being rewarded in the next life 
(akhirah),” counter-terror fatwas citing Islamic texts can remove this certainty through doubt and 
ultimately prevent attacks from happening.313  However, as this research has found, after 






Islam as a religion of peace to justify their position. Yet, these Qur’anic verses that present Islam 
as a religion of peace have conditions and limitations, and are neither unequivocal or absolute 
pronouncements of peace. Moreover, the counter-terror fatwas never mention, and do not 
challenge, the specific Qur’anic verses that endorse violence. Because of this omission, these 
counter-terror fatwas are unable to challenge directly, and hence potentially disrupt, the 
ideological core of Islamist terrorism. Furthermore, the thesis found that the few counter-terror 
fatwas that challenge specific Qur’anic verses that endorse violence received little to no media 
coverage. This starkly contrasts with most of the counter-terror fatwas that are far less 
sophisticated and do not question the interpretation of specific verses.  
The interviews with the counter-terror fatwa issuers offered some clues as to why a 
significant disparity in publicity exists between unsophisticated counter-terror fatwas and 
sophisticated counter-terror fatwas. The explanations offered, though, were not terribly 
convincing. The issuers of unsophisticated counter-terror fatwas stated they were intentionally 
short and indirect as this would enable them to connect with a broader audience. The most often 
cited reasons behind this decision were that people would be disinterested in reading long 
counter-terror fatwas, and that creating long counter-terror fatwas is a time-consuming and 
cumbersome undertaking. Other reasons mentioned included: ensuring it could be physically 
disseminated to a broader audience in terms, and that citing verses that presented Islam as a 
religion of peace was the superior strategy in deterring Islamist terrorism. None of these reasons 
held up to scrutiny, as can be seen in Chapter 2. There may be a constraint that prevents more 
sophisticated counter-terror fatwas from being issued. One issuer of a sophisticated counter-
terror fatwa that I interviewed attributes this constraint to a matter of what he calls a “line of 




counter-terror fatwas. He explains that his moderate line of reasoning departs from that of a more 
conventional one in two fundamental ways: 1) it downgrades the hadith from a primary source of 
interpretation to a secondary one; and 2) he freely contextualizes Qur’anic verses, such as those 
endorsing violence, to either their text or their “environment.” Altogether, these changes allow 
Amjad to challenge the Qur’anic verses endorsing violence, which is explained in greater detail 
in Chapter 2. He argues that the other issuers are unable to make a sophisticated counter-terror 
fatwa because the issuers use the very same line of reasoning as those who issue terror fatwas. 
He added that the counter-terror fatwas we see today are merely rhetorical responses.  
The interviews provided clues about why a significant disparity exists between the media 
coverage given to unsophisticated counter-terror fatwas and sophisticated counter-terror fatwas. 
Most issuers of unsophisticated counter-terror fatwas paint the media as an ally, and list it as the 
primary source for positive support and responses (see Chapter 2). The issuer of the sophisticated 
counter-terror fatwa disclosed an attempt by those close to him to bring the fatwa to the attention 
of the country’s media, but this resulted in their exile.  
This research is important because it is the first of its kind, examining exclusively fatwas 
and the role they play in countering Islamist terrorism. Fatwas are authoritative religious edicts 
that, although not binding for most Muslims, influence large segments of the Muslim community 
that are preoccupied with attaining Paradise in the hereafter. Fatwas matter because they are the 
medium through which Jurists, namely Muftis, apply the principles of Shar’iah to the practical 
world, effectively determining for Muslims the five moral categories of actions in current times.  
While proactive militaristic measures have been largely utilized for the past few decades in the 
fight against Islamist terrorism with no substantive gains (a strategy which one prominent study 




serve as a welcome addition to the relatively-recent counter-narratives that seek to tackle the 
ideology of Islamist terrorism. In fact, as this thesis is the first to argue, counter-terror fatwas 
would be the most authoritative form of counter-narrative available. With studies repeatedly 
affirming a marked increase in religiosity prior to Islamist terrorists partaking in jihad, the 
influence of counter-terror fatwas would be unparalleled, as it appeals directly to the religious 
ideas taken up by the terrorists, especially with regard to securing entry to heaven. However, to 
become more effective in deterring Islamist terrorism, counter-terror fatwas must do more than 
cite Qur'anic verse that present Islam as a religion of peace. As this thesis has shown, these 
verses have conditions and limitations, and cannot be unequivocal in their presentation of Islam 
as a religion of peace. If counter-terror fatwas are permitted to challenge Qur'anic verses that 
endorse violence, only then can the ideological core of Islamist terrorism be directly confronted. 
By challenging the Qur’anic verses endorsing violence that is used to justify Islamist terrorism, 
the counter-terror fatwa can best create doubt in the minds of potential Islamist terrorists inspired 
by such verses. This builds on Hussein’s argument that “where there is doubt, in Islamic 
religious behavior, there is avoidance,” and since Islamist terrorists “currently kill because they 
have certainty (yaqeen) of being rewarded in the next life (akhirah),” counter-terror fatwas citing 
Islamic texts can remove this certainty through doubt and ultimately prevent future attacks.314 
This thesis is not without limitations. The first limitation concerns the number of counter-
terror fatwas that I have selected for my study. As had been stated earlier, out of the 50 Sunni 
counter-terror fatwas that I have identified, only 36 fatwa documents could be found and 
examined. Needless to say, the 14 remaining counter-terror fatwa documents very well could 






likely be minor. If we are to deduce from the current polarizing trajectories of the four-way 
typology, which was used to classify the available fatwas in reference to their content’s levels of 
sophistication and degree of online news exposure, then it would seem that the impact from the 
addition of the 14 outstanding counter-terror fatwas would very likely be negligible. The second 
limitation concerns the number of counter-terror fatwa issuers I have interviewed. My thesis 
could obviously have benefited from interviewing more issuers. However, I would argue that 
since many of the explanations issued by the issuers converged in some key ways, it would seem 
unlikely that more interview data would have made any significant difference.   
 A possible avenue for future research could involve a broader survey of other types of 
developed counter-narratives (outside of counter-terror fatwas) in order to examine and 
ultimately determine how many of them mention or challenge the scriptural core of Islamic 
terrorist ideology, and more importantly, to what extent. As previously mentioned, the issuers of 
unsophisticated counter-terror fatwas have stated that they or their organization have released or 
are releasing an article or book that refutes the specific Qur’anic verses that endorse violence that 
and are typically used to justify Islamic terrorism, but as this thesis examines in Appendix A and 
Appendix B, the released documents discuss only 5 out of 17 and 4 out of 17 specific Qur’anic 
passages that promote and justify terrorism, respectively. The popular Letter to Baghdadi, 
praised by the interviewed issuers for its theological rigor in refuting ISIS, only discusses 5 out 
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Syed B. Soharwardy’s Defeating Hate: A Comprehensive Rebuttal to Taliban Al-Qaeda Daesh 
(ISIS) and Islamophobes is examined to see if it discusses or challenges the specific Qur’anic 
verses that endorse violence and are typically used to justify Islamic terrorism. 315 The specific 
Qur’anic verses used to promote and justify terrorism316 were searched for in Soharwardy’s book 
(see Table 3). 











Table 3. Identifying the Qur’anic verses typically invoked to justify terrorism in Syed B. 
Soharwardy’s Defeating Hate: A Comprehensive Rebuttal to Taliban Al-Qaeda Daesh (ISIS) and 
Islamophobes. 
With regard to:  
9:5 But when these months, prohibited (for fighting), are over, slay the idolaters 
wheresoever you find them, and take them captive or besiege them, and lie in wait for them 
at every likely place. But if they repent and fulfil their devotional obligations and pay 
the zakat, then let them go their way, for God is forgiving and kind.  
 
This verse is discussed in the book. He states that after Mecca came under Muslim rule, Muslims 
were commanded to abide by agreements with pagan groups, and that Muslims neither looted, 
nor exhibited any violence after securing a victorious takeover of Mecca—and they didn’t force 
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any conversions. However, he argues, the above verse was just a “precautionary guidance to 
Muslims that if someone attacks you, you do have the right to defend yourself and fight back.”317  
He adds, “As a point of fact, no violence took place after Muslims got their victory. The few 
people who were executed, were not punished in this way because they were non-Muslims, but 
because they had been fugitives, and hiding in Makkah. They had murdered innocent people, and 
their families were looking for justice.”318  
With regard to:  
9:111 God has verily bought the souls and possessions of the faithful in exchange for a 
promise of Paradise. They fight in the cause of God, and kill and are killed. This is a 
promise incumbent on Him, as in the Torah, so the Gospel and the Qur’an. And who is 
more true to his promise than God? So rejoice at the bargain you have made with Him; for 
this will be triumph supreme. 
 
This verse is discussed in the book. He argues that this verse and others that advocate jihad are 
all “very specific for the Muslim army facing wars.”319 These verses are not meant to target 
civilians and call for them to take up arms because “the civilians of the (original) Muslim State 
never acted as soldiers and fought against the enemy.”320 The only way civilians could join the 
conflict was to join the army. He argues that this reasoning “proves that the terrorism and 
violence against civilians is absolutely un-Islamic, unjust, criminal and punishable under Islamic 
law.”321 He adds, “Just as every army rewards and honours its soldiers due to their bravery and 
courage, Allah says the same: that the soldiers of a Muslim country will be honoured and 
rewarded with Heaven when they fight back and defend their country.”322 
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With regard to:  
2:190-191 “Fight those in the way of God who fight you, but do not be aggressive: God 
does not like aggressors. 
 
And fight those (who fight you) wheresoever you find them, and expel them from the place 
they had turned you out from. Oppression is worse than killing. Do not fight them by the 
Holy Mosque unless they fight you there. If they do, then slay them: Such is the requital 
for unbelievers.”  
 
These verses are discussed in the book. He argues these verses and the two that follow merely 
stipulate the laws of jihad and affirm that they cannot be used to hurt civilians, irrespective of 
whether they are Muslim. According to him, these verses “only apply to a combat situation of 
two opposing armies facing each other on the battlefield, and specifically refer to the enemy 
combatants who were expected to attack Muslim pilgrims on their way to perform the Hajj.”323 
He situates the verse within a specific historical context, a time period when Pagans controlled 
Mecca and, according to Soharwardy, were “brutally murdering Muslims for the past two 
decades,” repeatedly launching attacks on Medina.324 Thus, Muslims that wanted to perform the 
pilgrimage (Hajj)—a journey which requires them to travel unarmed—feared they may be killed 
by these Pagans, and so the Companions of the Prophet Muhammad asked him for guidance on 
this particular matter, to which Allah, according to Soharwardy, “responded with the above 
verse, telling Muslims to defend themselves if and only if they were attacked by the pagans 
first.”325 
With regard to:  
8: 39 So, fight them till all opposition ends, and obedience is wholly God’s. If they desist 
then verily God sees all they do. 
																																																						







This verse is discussed among the other Qur’anic verses that endorse jihad. He argues that the 
statement made here “does not differ from what any army would do when their country is under 
attack.”326 He adds that, when compared to the United States and other Western countries, “these 
Qur’anic verses are much softer and more lenient towards the combatants of an enemy army.”327 
As do all countries that participate in war, a Muslim country also desires victory, and “therefore, 
the verses in question are not about supremacy of Islam, but about victory in a war. No army will 
engage itself in a war it does not want to win.”328 
 Altogether, this book discusses only 5 out of the 17 specific Qur’anic verses that endorse 



















Jamal Badawi’s article, “Muslim / Non-Muslim Relations: Reflections on Some Qur’anic 
Texts,” is examined to see if it discusses or challenges specific Qur’anic verses that endorse 
violence and are typically used to justify Islamic terrorism. 329The specific Qur’anic verses used 
to promote and justify terrorism330 were searched for in Badawi’s article (see Table 4):  
 











Table 4. Identifying Qur’anic verses typically invoked to justify terrorism in Jamal Badawi’s 
article Muslim / Non-Muslim Relations: Reflections on Some Qur’anic Texts. 
With regard to:  
 
9:5 But when these months, prohibited (for fighting), are over, slay the idolaters 
wheresoever you find them, and take them captive or besiege them, and lie in wait for them 
at every likely place. But if they repent and fulfil their devotional obligations and pay 
the zakat, then let them go their way, for God is forgiving and kind.  
 
This verse is discussed in the article. Badawi fully explains the verse, making several important 
points. He first points out that this verse does not affect the People of the Book, such as the Jews 
and Christians, and emphasizes this critical distinction between them and other non-Muslims. 
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According to him, “all these and similar verses have sometimes been misconstrued and taken out 
of their textual and historical context.”331 He adds that “All of these verses, without exception, if 
studied carefully, address aggression and oppression committed against Muslims at the time of 
the Prophet [P], whether by idolatrous Arabs, some of the Jewish tribes in Madinah, or by some 
Christians.”332 He then describes how each of these groups exhibit aggression against Muslims 
and sought to oppress them, and concludes his analysis of this verse by stating that “the issue is 
not religion, but rather injustice, oppression and aggression” and offers three points in support of 
this final point: 1) Many Qur’anic verses state that coexistence is possible between non-Muslims 
and Muslims, if the former acts justly and peacefully; 2) Throughout the 1400 years of Muslim 
history, religious minorities not only survived but thrived, and were free to practice their faiths; 
3) The Qur’an allows Muslim men to marry Christian or Jewish women.333  
With regard to:  
 
2:190-191 “Fight those in the way of God who fight you, but do not be aggressive: God 
does not like aggressors. 
 
And fight those (who fight you) wheresoever you find them, and expel them from the place 
they had turned you out from. Oppression is worse than killing. Do not fight them by the 
Holy Mosque unless they fight you there. If they do, then slay them: Such is the requital 
for unbelievers.”  
 
These verses are discussed in the article, and acknowledge that they describe militant jihad. 
However, according to him, “it is obvious from these key verses that the only two justifications 
of the combative-type of Jihad are to stop aggression and severe oppression. The condition for 
ceasing hostilities is not acceptance of Islam, but halt to aggression and oppression.”334 
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With regard to:  
2: 216 Enjoined on you is fighting, and this you abhor. You may dislike a thing yet it may 
be good for you; or a thing may haply please you but may be bad for you. Only God has 
knowledge, and you do not know.  
 
This verse is discussed in the article. He states that this verse proves that defensive war is 
described as if it is something “inherently hated. However, as a last resort, it may be better than 
doing nothing in the face of aggression or oppression.”335   
Altogether, this article discusses only 4 out of the 17 specific Qur’anic verses that 



















The “Letter to Baghdadi” is examined to see if it discusses or challenges specific Qur’anic verses 
that endorse violence and are typically used to justify Islamic terrorism. 336 This letter was 
released in September 2014 and was signed by more than 120 Muslim leaders and scholars.337 
The specific Qur’anic verses used to promote and justify terrorism338 were searched for in the 
letter (see Table 5).  
Qur’anic Verses Mentioned (✓) or Not Mentioned (X) 
4:74-4:76 ✓ (only mentions 4:75) 
4:84 X 
9:5 X 
9:38-39 ✓ (only mentions 9:38) 
9:111 X 
9:13-15 X 




Table 5. Identifying Qur’anic verses typically invoked to justify terrorism in the Letter to 
Baghdadi 
 
With regard to:  
 
4:74-76 “Those who barter the life of this world for the next should fight in the way of 
God. And we shall bestow on him who fights in the way of God, whether he is killed or is 
victorious, a glorious reward 
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What has come upon you that you fight not in the cause of God and for the oppressed, men, 
women and children, who pray: "Get us out of this city, O Lord, whose people are 
oppressors; so send us a friend by Your will, and send us a helper 
 
Those who believe fight in the way of God; and those who do not, only fight for the powers 
of evil; so you should fight the allies of Satan. Surely the stratagem of Satan is ineffective.”  
  
  
Only Qur’anic verse 4:75 is discussed in this letter. The letter states that Muslims should protect 
the weak, such as children; this stance effectively challenges ISIS for employing children as part 
of their war campaign: “You have made children engage in war and killing. Some are taking up 
arms and others are playing with the severed heads of your victims. Some children have been 
thrown into the fray of combat and are killing and being killed. In your schools some children are 
tortured and coerced into doing your bidding and others are being executed.” 339 The letter 
concludes that “these are crimes against innocents who are so young they are not even morally 
accountable.”340 
With regard to: 
9:38-39 What happened to you, O believers, that when you are asked to set out in the cause 
of God your feet begin to drag? Do you find the life of the world so pleasing that you forget 
the life to come? Yet the profit of the life of this world is but meagre as compared to the 
life to come. 
  
Unless you go out (to strive), God will inflict grievous punishment on you, and bring other 
people in your place, and you will not be able to harm Him in the least, for God has the 
power over all things. 
 
Both verses 9:38 and 2:190 are discussed explicitly together in the letter’s section on jihad, 
however 9:39 and 2:191 are not mentioned. Using 9:38 and 2:90, they argue that “all Muslims 
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see the great virtue in jihad.” 341 They add that prominent Imams of the four schools, and even all 
scholars, agree that jihad is only a communal obligation (fard kifayah), not an individual 
obligation (fard ayn). They argue that jihad cannot be used against other Muslims, “The word 
‘jihad’ is an Islamic term that cannot be applied to armed conflict against any other Muslim; this 
much is a firmly established principle.”342 Additionally, they point out that scholars unanimously 
agree that “jihad is conditional upon the consent of one’s parents.” 343 They also mention there 
are two kinds of jihad: greater jihad, which is the struggle against one’s ego, and lesser jihad, 
which is armed struggle against the enemy, and they emphasize the former over the latter.344 
With regard to: 
 
2:190-191 “Fight those in the way of God who fight you, but do not be aggressive: God 
does not like aggressors. 
 
And fight those (who fight you) wheresoever you find them, and expel them from the place 
they had turned you out from. Oppression is worse than killing. Do not fight them by the 
Holy Mosque unless they fight you there. If they do, then slay them: Such is the requital 
for unbelievers.”  
 
Verse 2:190 is mentioned in conjunction with 9:38; however, verses 2:191 and 9:39 are not 
mentioned. Please refer to the comment addressing 9:38 for further details. 
With regard to:  
 
22: 39-40 Permission is granted those (to take up arms) who fight because they were 
oppressed. God is certainly able to give help to those who were driven away from their 
homes for no other reason than they said: “Our Lord is God.” And if God had not restrained 
some men through some others, monasteries, churches, synagogues and mosques, where 
the name of God is honoured most, would have been razed. God will surely help those who 










These verses are mentioned in the letter. This letter argues that the above verses affirm that jihad 
for Muslims is intended strictly for those who fight or transgress them and it is “tied to safety, 
freedom of religion, having been wronged, and eviction from one’s land.”345 They add following 
historical context to clarify these verses: “These two verses were revealed after the Prophet and 
his companions suffered torture, murder, and persecution for thirteen years at the hands of the 
idolaters. Hence, there is no such thing as offensive, aggressive jihad just because people have 
different religions or opinions.”346 This position, they argue, is held by “Abu Hanifa, the Imams 
Malik and Ahamd and all other scholars including Ibn Taymiyyah, with the exception of some 
scholars of the Shafi’I school.”347   
Altogether, this book discusses only 5 out of the 17 specific Qur’anic verses that endorse 
violence and are typically used to justify Islamist terrorism. 
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